**An open issue, implies infinite possibilities**

**- taking Okinawa (Ryukyu) as an example to explore the peace in Northeast Asia**

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**Repetition of History: Contradictions of Two Orders**  
Since the end of the Cold War, we seem to be again in a state of being on the brink of war. If we see from the viewpoint that the Cold War in Northeast Asia never ends, this state of being on the brink of war indeed did not just start right now. From 1953, the Korean Peninsula has always been in such a “truce” state, which can't be called peace. Taiwan Strait is likewise unstable: unification and independence struggle in Taiwan, the specifications of US-Taiwan relations in the form of domestic law of the United States, and the fact that mainland China has defined in its Constitution that Taiwan is not allowed to split from it, and all these are actually forming a fragile tension. The imbalance of any angles may possibly lead to a conflict. If the two above-mentioned states of being on the brink of war are the direct continuation of the Cold War structure, so then the wrestling of China and Japan on the Diaoyu Island in the East China Sea, the conflict between China and the Philippines as well as Vietnam around the South China Sea, and the ubiquitous “rebalancing” of the United States, is the new state of being on the brink of war in the global and regional geopolitical relations. Thinking and exploring the peace in Northeast Asia, we need first of all to describe the nature of being on the brink of war status today.

Japanese theorist Kojin Karatani was inspired by Karl Marx's “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte”, a text discussing the phenomenon that "history repeats itself". He said: “I strongly feel that the repetition of history is now taking place in the region of East Asia. The Sino-Japanese War in 1894 has shaped the current geopolitical structure of East Asia, which happened to be 120 years ago ... this is just right close to the length of time that a historical cycle takes. Here, the role players include mainly Mainland China, China Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, Japan, Okinawa, as well as USA and Russia which are no doubt very important. (N1)” Instead of taking the starting point of “repetition” in the 1930s, Kojin Karatani set it in the 1890s.

Why not the 1930s? In the 1930s China was torn apart, the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan

regions were in a totally colonial state. It was an imperialist, colonial and semi-colonial era, while China in the 1890s, although decaying, still remained in this region the most vast and powerful empire.  North Korea, Vietnam and other neighboring countries were China's vassal states, while Japan, through the Meiji Restoration, was turning itself into a new imperialist country. Therefore, the similarity between the 1890s and the current situation is that China is regaining its great power status, and Northeast Asia is again found inthe relations ofempire and imperialism (N2). Here, the empire and imperialism refers to a structure of international relations, not simply indicating the relations between China, Japan and other states. The concept of an empire does not only imply a large political community, but also the norms of a world order; the concept of imperialism does not only represent the expansionof a certain state, but also the norms of an international order.

I started thinking about the regional order in East Asia also from the perspective of the empire and imperialism in the 19th century, but how to put this description into the contemporary context needs probably more considerations. When in 1848 the second French Revolution put Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte on the throne, this was not, however, repeating the pattern of establishing the Roman Empire after the assassination of Caesar, although in Northeast Asia emerged a seemingly similar structure as in 1890s; neither will the new conflicts ever be a replica of the Sino-Japanese War. Korea and Vietnam, after having experienced the national revolution and the war against foreign invasion, became the independent states which are no longer the vassal states of China anymore; Japan and South Korea, having been placed in the US empire military-political protection circles during the Cold War era, have become developed states but of semi-sovereignty because of their dependent development respectively. As for China, any definitions of its nature have to deal with two continuities of Chinese history: the first is the continuity between the empire and the modern state - after a long series of wars and revolutions, China not only broke free from the semi-colonial status, but also became part of the regional and global order with its own independence won from the revolutions (neither being dependent on the United States nor on the Soviet Union). Meanwhile, the scale of its population and geography remained largely the same as the former empire of the 20th century. The second continuity is the one between the socialist period and the post-socialist period. China was the very first factorwhich has triggered the dramatic change of 1989-91 in the world socialist system, but at the end of the Cold War, people were surprised to find that: after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Eastern European socialism, China's political structure has not fundamentally changed. However, whether contemporary China is, as in the 1890s, representing a kind of imperial order, and therefore with which challenging the existing western imperial order? After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, China is no longer a country which maintains the imperial order in Northeast Asia.If Japan wishes to be a so-called “normal state”, the dimension of being “normal” can certainly not be gained from its competition with China, but only from its liberation from the protection / constraints of the US imperial order. If the traditional tribute relations in East Asia are a form of unequal vassal relations, then the US imperial order is based upon the “dominate - subordinate relation” by the concept of formally equal and sovereign states. However, the fact that Japan, as a sovereignty state**,**attempts to become a “normal state” doesn't clearly demonstrate the disconnection between the form and the substance of the so-called “sovereignty”?

Among the several roles mentioned by Kojin Karatani, the one revealing most the change of the regional order in East Asia is precisely the one which is most easily overlooked: Okinawa.  Taking Ryukyu (Okinawa) as an example to explore the changes of both empire and imperialism order in the 19th and 20th century as well as the contemporary times can help us understand that today's structure is really the “repetition” of the 1890s. This is an interesting proposition. Choosing to focus on Okinawa has several considerations: first of all, the US military base in Okinawa islands occupying a central location is not only a product of World War II and the Cold War, but also the central issue of the current military hegemony in Asia. The Sino-Japanese conflict around the Diaoyu Island issue is actually a byproduct of Okinawa: the East China Sea, the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, the Korean Peninsula, as well as the military containment of Russia, all take Okinawa as a strategic center. Second, social movement of Okinawa demonstrates multiple directions, that is seeking the independence from the US-Japan framework, and the autonomy under the sovereignty of Japan, a non-military, peaceful, neither a sovereign state, nor an entity incorporated within China or Japan; anti-US military base and anti-war ... of which the appeal of independence is the continuation of the appeal of anti-imperialism, the demands of autonomy are the expedient amends of the previous appeal; the peaceful autonomous entity is the closest to the empire-kingdom or vassal structure, the anti-war and anti-base movement brings to this structure a wholly new connotation of pacifism. To reflect on this issue, I will set the “repetition” between the 1870s and the present, instead of between the 1890s and today — it was right in 1870s when the rules of the conflict between Northeast Asian traditional vassal - tribute system and the imperialist system had undergone dramatic changes.

**The Okinawa Question, Regional Relations, and the Dramatic Transformation of International Rules in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries**

Prior to the 1870s, Okinawa (called “the Ryukyus” at the time) was an exceptional kingdom that had long maintained a tributary/ suzerain-feudal relationship with China. In order to preserve its position, it actually established tributary relations with both China and Japan.  Regardless of the specific geopolitical and cultural situation, however, Ryukyus’ status was upheld within a mode of order utterly different from that of the sovereign or nation-state. For the moment, let's use the not entirely appropriate term “ tribute system” to refer to this mode of order, as, in general, it means that modern nationalism did not grow out of it. From the 1870s, Japanese domination of the Ryukyus took place under a new form of relationship, that is, taking the Ryukyus within Japanese jurisdiction.

Changes since the nineteenth century do not simply derive from changes in the hegemonic positions of China and Japan in the region, but also stem from drastic changes to general international rules.  The dramatic change of rules cannot be described simply in terms of the relations between one state and another, as it refers to the transformation and rupture of the basic principles underlying the political entities and communities in the region. Without realizing the extent of this rupture and transformation, we cannot understand the modern history of Okinawa, the 1894 Sino-Japanese War and subsequent cession of Taiwan, the colonization of the Korean peninsula, the establishment and the collapse of Manchukuo, or the political - military logic of the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere". On December 23, 1871, the Meiji government sent out a diplomatic delegation, led by Iwakura Tomomi and Kido Takayoshi, which, in the period of twenty-two months, visited twelve countries, including the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Italy and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It is said that this delegation spent one million Japanese yen (amounting to more than 2% of the fiscal revenue of the Meiji government in 1872) (N3).  In *An Explanation for the Dispatching of the Ministers Plenipotentiary (Haken tokumei zenkentaishi jiyū sho)*, the Meiji government set out one of the missions of the group as being to "explain to and consult with the governments of other nations on the aims and hopes of our government,” so as to "revise the past treaties and enact an independent and unrestrained system" "according to international public law *(Wangguo gongfa)*. (N4)” On March 15, 1873, this Iwakura diplomatic delegation paid a call on Otto von Bismarck, the German "Iron Chancellor", whose influence on modern Japanese thought cannot be underestimated; Okubo Toshimichi admired him immensely. Talking of the transformation of a poor Prussia into the great German empire, Bismarck told the delegation that "all the states in the world today communicate through friendly etiquette, but this is only on the surface — the reality is of the strong bullying the weak and the great humiliating the small…So-called international law is said to be the standard by which the rights of all nations are protected, but when great powers contend for their interests, if observing international law is expedient, they observe it punctiliously; if it is not expedient, they quickly resort to force. It is thus never observed without exception. (N5)” Of this, Okubo wrote to Saigo Takamori:" After hearing these words of Bismarck', I began to feel that Japan has a bright future. (N6)”

The extent of this event’s influence was not limited to Japan's self-strengthening (N7), as the Meiji government’s efforts to use Western international law to gain space for itself in Asia eventually turned into a logic of imperialism and expansionism. The Pacific War was the result of the direct conflict between this logic and a similar American logic at work in the same region. In the early days of the Meiji period, Japan several times sent emissaries to China seeking the Qing government’s signature to commercial treaties patterned after those signed with the Western powers. Behind these demands lay the desire to expand into Korea and the Ryukyus. " The policy of those who controlled the government in the early Meiji period, such as Iwakura Tomomi and Kido Takayoshi, was to invade China and Korea, using the forces that had toppled the Shogunate, so as to consolidate the power of the center. At the time, Korea was nominallya dependency (*Shubang*) of China, so when the Japanese government sent a delegation to Korea requesting that it open its ports to commerce, the Koreans asked Japan to sign a commercial treaty with China first, and only after that sign one with Korea. So the Japanese government’s active pursuit of the conclusion of a Sino-Japanese commercial treaty was, on the one hand, to solve domestic conflicts, and on the other, to gain the qualifications for access to Korea. (N8) " From the perspective of this logic, the narrative that has Pacific war (in 1940s, in the name of "the struggle for living space") as completely different from the " Great East Asian War " (1890--1940, the imperialist expansion, invasion, and colonization) does not hold up.

Japan itself has undergone a fundamental transformation in the process of adapting to changes in international law. Japanese expansionism, however, did not begin in the Meiji period. Toyotomi Hideyoshi's military action in invading Korea and his plans built on that invasion to sweep into Ming China and India, for example, are clear illustrations of an earlier expansionism, however, such expansionist activities differ little from traditional offensive and dynastic wars in Asia, and therefore cannot explain events of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. We still must ask: What principles did Meiji Japan bring onto play in gaining control of these areas? I think that the self-conscious use of the new form of international law was one of the most important new features here. The American missionary W. A. P. Martin’s *International Public Law (Wanguo gongfa)*, a translation into Chinese of the American jurist Henry Wheaton’s (1785-1848) *Elements of International Law* (1836), was initially published in 1864 and was very quickly transmitted to Japan. This represented the introduction of Western nation-state logic into East Asia --- both the Chinese and the Japanese were instructed that their conflicts and antagonisms with the West derived from their own ignorance and misunderstanding of international law, and that any change in behavior needed to take place in accordance with this law, that is, as nation-states under international law. It should be noted that although Japan in the early Meiji was also encumbered by unequal treaties with Western states, it still made every effort to employ such treaties in order to expand into China, Korea and other places.

During the course of the Japanese occupation of the Archipelago, what changes took place in the relationship between Japan and the Ryukyus?  The Archipelago consists of the Osumi Islands, the Tokara Islands, the Amami Islands, the Ryukyus Islands, and the Miyako Islands, accounting altogether for 4,500 square kilometers. The Ryukyu tribute relations with the Chinese court can be traced back to the "three mountains period” in 1372, with Chūzan being the first of the islands to pay tribute to Ming China, followed by Nanzan and Hokuzan. These three small kingdoms were respectively enfeoffed by Ming China. In the early fifteenth century, the united Ryukyu Kingdom took shape, and it continued to pay tribute to China. In 1609, the Japanese Satsuma Han (the Shimazu Clan) took the Ryukyus militarily and the Ryukyu king was forced secretly to submit to Japan vassalage. So although it still regarded China as its legitimate ruler, the kingdom was heavily taxed by Japan for more than 270 year. Dual tribute relations between the Ryukyu kingdom and the Ming on the one hand and between the Ryukyus and Satsuma (and eventually to the Edo Bakufu) on the other thus came into being, although the Ryukyuan King was still enfeoffed by the Chinese court up through the Qing Dynasty. In October 1872, the Meiji government first reduced the Ryukyus from a Kingdom to a feudal clan (*han*), and then in March 1879 invaded, establishing Okinawa Prefecture (*ken*), after which the Ryukyus became part of the Japanese “homeland” (N9). The Ruykyus are both poor and small, like the Himalayan kingdoms of Bhutan and Sikkim. Why were all these small political entities able to exist among a number of much larger political entities without becoming a part of them? And with the advent of the era of the nation-state, why did they gradually turn into special regions of nation-states? What sort of cultural, political and institutional flexibility was able to provide these small political communities with relative autonomy, and what sort of cultural, political and formal system ultimately caused them to be included within a formalist concept of sovereignty? All these issues are crucial to understand the war and peace in Northeast Asia.

In the Asian region, especially along China’s borders, the relationships among the political entities that are now often classified under concept of the tribute system were totally different from those among nation-states. There is also an inner-outer aspect to tribute relations, but it differs from the inner and outer defined by borders and administrative jurisdiction within those boarders, with what is considered close or distant and near or far in the former following a different logic from the inner and outer of the latter. In the tribute system, the distinction among close or distant and near or far allows a significant degree of ambivalence and flexibility between inner and outer, but the distinction in the nation-state system is more rigid. According to the principle of sovereignty, the clear demarcation between inner and outer produces an absolute opposition between independence and unification, with no in-between gray area allowed; The tribute system, however, is more like a system based on differentiated degrees of kinship and affinity, a relationship flexibly produced by the practice of its participants. Tribute relations, therefore, cannot be equated to the relationships of inner-outer in the nation-state sense. Of course, the difference between tribute relations and treaty relations is a normative and formal difference, with cases of historical overlap. I have conceptualized this overlapping relationship as the dual process of empire-building and state-building in the course of dynastic history, with the relationships between inner and outer under the empire often embodying different models, according to each case; while they are all classified as belonging to the tribute system, they differ in substance (N10). The tribute system was not uniform and standardized, but was characterized by more flexible sorts of relationships.

In the era of nationalism, a region either belongs to a given political entity or has sovereign independence — there is no relationship or form that consists of neither unity nor independence, something that signifies the collapse of the traditional mode of relationships. The Japanese colonization of the Ryukyus and its first invasion of Taiwan in 1874 brought significant change to the longtime and effective norms of interaction in Asia. This was not merely the process of one kingdom annexing another, or the waxing and waning of Japanese and Chinese power, but also a sharp transformation of universal norms. The Japanese invasion of Korea, the 1894 Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, the "Great East Asia War," and the Pacific War were the sequential embodiments of this normative transformation. In this new era, the legitimacy and legality of the occupation and aggression of one political entity against another relied upon a new set of norms — the old system no longer worked. This is a major event in world history. The source of Okinawa question emerges from two overlapping processes: endogenous Japanese expansionism and the universalizing of (imperialist) nationalist norms.

**The Earliest Use of the Imperialist International Law**

In 1874, a year after China and Japan exchanged their first treaty, Japan invaded Taiwan on the pretext of a conflict that occurred in November 1871 (in which fifty-four people died) between Taiwanese Aboriginals and Ryukyuan fishermen who had ran into a typhoon. Japan initially attempted to open channels with the Qing government through Ryukyuan channels, but later attempted to use this incident as a springboard to attack Taiwan. Prior to the war, in May 1873, the Japanese foreign minister Soejima Taneomi arrived in Beijing requesting an audience with the emperor, and then sent his deputy, Yanagiwara Sakimitsu, to question Mao Changxi and Dong Xun of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where they asked the Qing government to punish the Taiwanese Aboriginals. Mao Changxi responded: " I've heard that [our] 'vassal' people killed the Ryukyuans, but I have heard nothing about your people being hurt. Both islands belong to us, and if the residents of each kill one another, it is something completely within our jurisdiction. I am in sympathy with the Ryukyuans and we will deal with the matter ourselves — since there is no concern of yours, why bother yourself to question me?" Obviously, Mao Changxi did not recognize Japanese jurisdiction over the Ryukyus. As he pointed out at the time: "All the murders are ‘savages’(s*hengfan*), so we regard them as beyond the reach of civilizing, and thus difficult to rule properly. The 'Xiayi' in Japan [i.e., the Ainu in Hokkaido] and the ‘red savages’ (*hongfan*) [i.e., Native Americans] in the U. S. do not obey the kingly teaching, either — this is something common to all countries. (N11)" Qing China had a number of legal traditions, for instance, the Qing Code, the Mongol Code, the system of hereditary chieftains in the Southwest, and the Kashag system in Tibet. In Taiwan, the *Shengfan* (“savage”) and *Shufan* (“civilized barbarians”) were treated differently. This unique system of rule derived from a governing strategy characterized by the principle of “ cong su cong yi” (follow local custom and what is appropriate) and enduring political-cultural relations in different regions; it was also related to the “foreign affairs” of the empire. After the war broke out in 1874, the Ministry of Foreign Affaires addressed a note to the Japanese foreign ministry on May 11: "We have taken note that there exist savages in isolated portions of Taiwan, who have yet to be bound by law, so we have not extended the bureaucratic system to those regions. This is based upon the teaching of the *Book of Rites (Li Ji)*, ‘Do not change their customs and what is appropriate for them,’ even though the territory undoubtedly belongs to China. Savages like this also exist in other provinces in China’s frontier regions, but they are all within our territory. China allows them to follow their own customs and what is appropriate for them. (N12)” “The Qing official’s arguments that the so-called *Shengfan* (“savage”) were beyond Qing legal jurisdiction is based upon the unique legal institutions of the Qing. A useful analogy here would be that mainland Chinese law differs from that of Hong Kong, but this difference provides no basis for a separate sovereignty for the region. Japan, however, interpreted the relationship between the Qing Code and local customary law as an inner-outer distinction in the sense of sovereign. *A Summary of the Expedition to the “Barbarian” Lands in Taiwan*, drafted on February 6, 1874, holds that “Taiwan’s local savage tribes are beyond the authority of the Qing government…It is, therefore, the obligation of the Japanese imperial government to punish them for their crime of having killed people from our vassal of the Ryukyus. This is the primary basis for the general principle behind punishing these savages… If the Qing insists that since the Ryukyus also paid tribute to them, it is also a Qing vassal, we will simply pay them no heed; it will be best to ignore their comments. Our empire has substantial control over the Ryukyus, and we may stop it from its violation of ritual by paying tribute to China after we punish Taiwan, but for the present it is futile to debate with the Qing government. (N13)”

The Japanese strategy was to differentiate the place they invaded from Taiwan, and on the pretext that these “savages” were “people beyond acculturation” (*huawai zhi min*) and thus without political affiliation, to claim that their attack on the Taiwanese Aboriginals was not an attack on the Qing. This explanation was in direct opposition to the position of the Qing. It is appropriate here to cite the dialogue explaining their respective positions between Li Hongzhang and Yanagiwara Sakimitsu, the new Japanese Minister to China:

… Li: Why do you claim that these savages in Taiwan are not part of Chinese jurisdiction? Yanagiwara: This is a place beyond Chinese politics and education. We also have grounds for our sending of troops. Question: What grounds do you have? (No response) … Yanagiwara: The savages in Taiwan are just like people without rulers and have nothing to do with China. Li: How can these savages be considered a state? Yanagiwara: No, they cannot be considered a state, they are merely barbaric (*yeman*). Li: They reside on our island of Taiwan, so how can they not be part of China?

Yanagiwara: Since China knew that these savages killed many people, why did you not punish them?

Li: Investigating and taking action against the leaders takes time and effort, so how do you know that we will not punish them? By the way, the people the savages killed are from the Ryukyus, not Japanese, so why did Japan get involved? Yanagiwara: The Ryukyuan king sent messengers to plead his grievances.Li: The Ryukyuan kingdom is a Chinese vassal state, so why did they not appeal to us?

Yanagiwara: Even before there was a treaty between us, our Satsuma feudatory planned to dispatch troops (N14).

Western military intervention in this area and the West’s intention to promote its laws formed the background of the Sino-Japanese debate on the status of Taiwan and the Ryukyus. In fact, the Japanese pretext for the invasion of Taiwan imitated the earlier American intruders. In 1853, the American Commodore Matthew C. Perry’s naval fleet knocked open the door to Japan, forcing Japan to sign the Convention of Kanagawa; and then Perry invaded Taiwan the next year. Perry once suggested to the U.S. government that it occupy the island: “ The geographical position of Taiwan makes it very suitable as a distribution point for American commerce, and from where we can establish trade routes to China, Japan, Okinawa, CochiChina, Cambodia, Siam, the Philippines and all the islands in the surrounding seas. (N15) ” In 1867, the U.S. government sent two warships to attack Taiwan, but fled in the face of strong local resistance. After that the United States adopted the strategy of “using Asians to fight Asians” so as to divide and undermine China, Japan, and Korea. The American Minister to Japan, C.E. De Long, reported to the American Department of State in October 1872:

“ The true policy of the representatives of the Western Powers to encourage Japan in a course of conduct thoroughly committing its government against this doctrine [i.e., the closed door policy and the China-Korea alliance], and by estranging its court from those of China and Corea make it an ally of the Western Powers.(N16)”

Japan’s first attack on Taiwan not only adopted the same pretext that the Americans had used in their incursion on Taiwan, but also used the maps and suggestions supplied directly to them by the American consul in Xiamen (Amoy), Charles le Gendre (1830-1899), who had undertaken surveys during the American incursion. The Japanese strategy of attacking Taiwan on the pretext that this “ barbarian land” (*fandi*) was beyond the reach of Chinese political rule and acculturation was, in fact, an American suggestion.

Since the American and Japanese invasions of Taiwan went hand in hand with the extension of the application of Western international law, and because the latter was regarded as advanced knowledge, the aggressors could use it as justification for war. It is under these new norms and the power these new norms impose that the institutional models for relationships, which do not posit rigid inner-outer distinction but meanwhile preserve pluralist diversity, progressively collapsed. It is this new mode of knowledge that legitimizes the Japanese subjugation of the Ryukyus, Taiwan, and eventually the Asian mainland. This knowledge did not originate in Japan, but was rather a by-product of the competition of the Western powers for regional spheres of influence. In other words, the rise of the Ryukyus, Taiwan, and Korea questions, as well as the subjugation of the mainland, accompanied the legitimization of modern nationalism and the decline of traditional relationships and their values. The Japanese invasion of Korea follows the same logic — it forced Korea to sign a treaty with Qing China, which by debasing the tribute system provided the premise for the imperialist expansion and new colonial rule via a notion of formally equal sovereignty. This transformation of norms treated aggression as a liberation and explained the expansionist logic of the traditional struggle for spheres of influence as the new zeitgeist. The conflict between Qing China and Japan in 1894-95 was caused directly by the Japanese invasion into Korea.

In Northeast Asia, the intervention of the European International Law in the nineteenth century was accompanied by the re-division of the regional relations based upon the notion of cultural inequality; The notion of the cultural inequality in the contemporary context is the notion of modernization. The contemporary Okinawan social movement critiques early modern Japanese thought through an analysis of modernization as providing the theoretical justification for Japanese colonial rule. The same logic is applied in Taiwan. The premise of nineteenth-century treaties was a formal equality among the agents, but the treaties signed under this premise were not actually equal. In fact, the notion of imperialism first arose from the competition among European powers for resources and colonies, so the idea of formal equality was only appropriate to relations among the metropolitan imperialist states themselves. When treaty relations moved to the realm of ties between imperialist powers and regions that had been colonized or otherwise oppressed, the agents of formal equality could only be established through unequal treaties. In late nineteenth-century Northeast Asia, the enfeoffment relations of the Ryukyus, Korea, and Vietnam with China could only be regarded as inappropriate when seen in the light of new idea of formal equality and its standards — they could only be taken as relationships of formal inequality. With such a dual standard, imperialist aggression was seen as liberation, because treaty relationships were taken as links between formally equal agents. Under this new form of knowledge, nationalism had created a new set of relationships and metrics, which destroyed by force another form of knowledge, as well as other institutions and sets of ritual that maintained relationships among political entities having existed in Asia. Therefore, the challenge of Japan to the traditional order in Northeast Asia directly embodied the clash between two different sorts of international relations.

**Movements for National Independence and Imagination of New Regional- International Relations**

Early international law was merely a set of rules among imperialist states, but with the development of movements for national independence and decolonization, many oppressed nations have become new sovereignty states and have used theories of sovereignty from international law to legitimize themselves. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence of the 1955 Bandung Conference synthesized a number of principles and achievements of international law. In this sense, the historical critique of international law cannot be equated to its negation, just as attempts to trace traditional models of political relations and interaction do not equal a move to reestablish them. Then meaning of such work lies in establishing a new horizon for reflection and critique, and conceiving of new types of regional-global relationships and the rules for them.

As a creation of the Cold War, as well as the embodiment of the military structure of globalization, the American military occupation of Okinawa remains in place. On May 15, 1972, Okinawa was “restored” to Japan by the United States, but discord ensued: first, Japan was not in full administrative control over Okinawa “post-restoration,” and the power relations of the Pacific War were still represented in Okinawan airspace. Second, historical relations between Okinawa and Japan cannot be properly encompassed by the term “restoration.” If the concept of “restoration” recognizes the history of modern Japanese expansion, it also signifies the conflict that the Okinawan anti-occupation movement is bound to develop with the Japanese government. Even if we can get around the concept of “restoration,” the sovereignty of Japan is even now limited by the political configurations of the Cold War era. Therefore, from the standpoint of nation-state logic, Okinawa will have to vacillate between the two options of identifying with Japan or seeking independence from it. During the early postwar years, Okinawa was even obliged to consider the possibility of becoming a part of the United States.

Aside of the two superpowers of the U.S and the Soviet Union, the sovereignty’s incompleteness or incomplete sovereignty is the universal destiny of both the Western and the Eastern countries under the Cold War. In the seventies of the last century, the Western countries used the so-called “Brezhnev Doctrine” to describe the "incomplete sovereignty" status of Eastern European countries, for the reason that the Eastern European countries were obliged to bind their destiny to the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact. However, Western European countries forgot to ask themselves the same question — aren't they themselves under the same Doctrine? In Asia, none of the Member States within the U.S. Cold War framework, such as Japan, Southeast Asian nations, Korea and Taiwan, has complete sovereignty. It is in this sense that China is an exception: through the war and confrontation with the U.S., through the debate and opposition with the Soviet Union, China gained a truly independent and autonomous sovereignty status under the extremely difficult conditions. If we do not forget, that the spirit of the Bandung Conference, the support to the non-aligned movements and to the national liberation movements, as well as the Third World Route and the united front strategy of the Eastern and Western Camps, all proved to be the international path to support China's independence and autonomy. From a broad perspective, it is this international path that provides an important impetus for the disintegration of the bipolar structure of the Cold War.

Any discussion on Okinawa’s position in the Cold War must inevitably take up the 1943 Cairo Conference. The Cairo Conference was held November 22-26, 1943, with the leaders of three great powers, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek, and their military-civilian officials holding numerous meetings over the course of the event. Military matters aside, the Cairo Conference repeatedly discussed postwar security issues and the status of the American military in the Pacific area, revealing the foresight of the United States and Britain in regard to the future world order (N17). There is a widely circulated notion that the Okinawa issue was not on Chiang’s agenda for the Cairo Conference, and that it was brought up by Roosevelt, with Chiang only responding passively: he “refused Okinawa twice” out of fear of the United States and Japan (N18). Consulting Chiang’s diary proved this to be incorrect ---Chiang was actually well prepared for the meeting, and his responses to Roosevelt had been carefully considered. In his diary entry for Saturday, November 3, Chiang mentioned his preparations for the meeting with Roosevelt and Churchill, and made two points, of which one held: “All Japanese public and private property in China (the regions occupied since the September 18, [1931] incident) should be restored to the Chinese government”, and this item sets a time limit for the restoration to China of Japanese interests there: September 18, 1931, which would exclude the Ryukyus from the agenda.

As the preparations for the Cairo Conference became more detailed, however, issues from before 1931, including the Ryukyus and Taiwan, inevitably appeared on the agenda. The sixth article of the *Advisory Office of the Military Commission Draft of the Issues to be Raised at the Cairo Conference for Chairman Chiang*specifies as follows:” Article 6, Japan should restore the following items to China: A. Lüshun and Dalian (public property and structures in these two places should be handed over to China without compensation); B. The South Manchuria railway and the Chinese Eastern Railway (restored to China without compensation); C. Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands (public property and structures in both places should be handed over to China without compensation); D. the Ryukyu Archipelago (should be put under international trusteeship, or designated as a de-militarized zone). (N19)”The date of this original draft is uncertain, but it must be prior to November 1943, when the Cairo Conference convened. Ching’a first mention of the Ryukyu issue is a dairy entry for , and it is very likely related to the draft prepared by the Advisory Office of the Military Commission. The entry reads: ‬

The Ryukyus and Taiwan have different status in our history. As a kingdom, the position of the Ryukyus resembles that of Korea, so we have resolved not to raise the issue, although the independence of Siam is something we should propose. NB: except for issue in which China, Britain [and] the U.S. have a common interest, it would be best for us not to discuss anything with Churchill at the meeting. For example, if the United States raises such issues as Hong Kong/ Kowloon, Tibet or the treatment of the overseas Chinese, we had best respond according to established principles and not quarrel with them (N20).

Some of the points here deserve attention: first, Chiang confirmed that the status of the Ryukyus in Chinese history differed from that of Taiwan, Tibet, and Hong Kong/ Kowloon; second, he emphasized that the status of the Ryukyus is similar to that of Korea; third, he pointed out that “we should propose” the independence of Siam; fourth, Chiang’s judgment that the Ryukyus are “similar” to Korea but “different” from Taiwan was made from the perspective of determining their respective positions in the nation-state system and did not involve the differences in the “similarities” or the similarities in the “differences”. Based upon the first point, when Chiang reconsidered his plans for the meeting , he no longer included the Ryukyu issue on his agenda. The second and the third points are relevant to his resolution that China should raise the issue of the independence of Korea and Siam. All these points are closely related to Chiang’s understanding of the world order in Chinese history, but his understandings are all in the service of a new historical situation, that is, the postwar international order. The official memorandum forwarded through Wang Chonghui on November 24, 1943, mentioned such matters as the restoration of the territory occupied by Japan, and the draft of the three-power “joint declaration” mentioned the independence of Korea, but did not bring up the Ryukyus.

Once the meeting had begun, however, the Ryukyu issue was eventually brought up. *The Diary of Chiang Kai-shek* contains the following entry for November 23, 1943:

I arrived at the dinner hosted by President Roosevelt , and we talked straight through past the late hour of 11, when I took my leave, without, however, having finished the discussion. We agreed to resume the discussion the next day, but the main issues brought up in tonight’s discussion were: A. The future regime in Japan. B. The talks centered around the matters of communism and imperialism. I very much appreciate Roosevelt’s policy towards Russian communism, and we can make use of our success to liberate the oppressed peoples in the world, so as to repay the American contribution to the world war; C. The territorial issue: the four Manchurian provinces as well as Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands should be restored to China. *The Ryukyus, however, can be put under the joint trusteeship of China and the U.S. under an international mandate. I proposed this for the following reasons: 1. I wanted to reassure the U.S., 2. The Ryukyus belonged to Japan even before the 1894-95 Sino-Japanese war and, 3. Joint trusteeship seems more appropriate than giving them exclusively to us;*[emphasis added] D. The Japanese indemnity to China, E. Xinjiang and investments there; F. Russian participation in the anti-Japanese war; G. Korean independence. I laid special emphasis on this point so as to attract his attention and asked him to support my idea, H. A joint general staff meeting of China and the U.S.; I. the Vietnam issue: I strongly suggested that China and the U.S. support its independence after the war and gain the approval of Britain; J. The monitoring of the three Japanese islands by the allied forces after the Japanese surrender. I at first suggested that the U.S. should assume leadership here and that china can send troops to assist if necessary, but he insisted that China should play the major role — there must be some deeper intent here. On this I did not express any hard and fast opinion. This is everything we discussed tonight (N21).

In his diary entry for November 23, Chiang Kai-shek reiterated his plan for joint administration of the Ryukyus by China and the United States without mentioning the status of the Ryukyus in Chinese history. He did, however, bring up three other reasons: “ *I. I wanted to reassure the U.S., 2. The Ryukyus belonged to Japan even before the 1894-95 Sino-Japanese war and, 3. Joint trusteeship seems more appropriate than giving them exclusively to us*” [emphasis added] (N22). We can infer from these points, especially the first, either that Chiang was worried that a request to hand over the Ryukyus, Taiwan and Pescadores all at once might cause the Americans unease, or that the United States was suspicious of China’s attitude toward the Ryukyus. As discussed above, Chiang had differentiated the Ryukyus from Taiwan, the Pescadores Islands, and the four Manchurian provinces from the start, so the wish to “reassure the U.S.” clearly refers to American intentions. Thus, his judgment that joint administration "is more appropriate than giving them exclusively to us” did not stem from the “Ryukyus having belonged to Japan even before the 1894-95 Sino-Japanese war,” but out of considerations of America’s actual objectives.

Since Chiang had grouped the Ryukyus and Korea together in his diary entry for November 15, why did he completely neglect to mention Ryukyuan independence when bringing up the independence of Korea, Siam, and Vietnam? This was probably related to his concern “to reassure the U.S.,” as Chiang had already realized that because of geopolitical strategic concerns, the United States would not give up military occupation of the Ryukyus after the war, and might not really want to deliver the Ryukyus to the exclusive jurisdiction of China. But this is only one aspect of the problem. From the differentiation Chiang made between the Ryukyus and Chinese territories like Tibet, his position bears upon the Chinese political tradition. According to this worldview, he could not equate traditional tribute (including suzerain) relations to relationships of sovereignty. The relationship of suzerainty between the Ryukyus and China had lasted for five hundred years, but Chinese dynasties rarely intervened in Ryukyuan domestic politics, something quite different from Satsuma’s military invasion and its setting up a “specially appointed governor” to intervene directly in Ryukyuan politics (N 23).From Chiang’s perspective, Taiwan and the Pescadores differed from the Ryukyus: the former had been under China’s direct administrative jurisdiction, with which the latter’s tribute or suzerain relationship could not be equated. Taiwan and the Pescadores, therefore, needed to be restored to Chinese rule, while the Ryukyus could only be subject to an international trusteeship — in rejecting Japan’s right to rule the Ryukyus, Chiang indicated that he did not accept Japan’s right to the Archipelago dating from the Meiji period. But neither did he use the model of “restoration” to provide a norm for the relationship between China and the islands — what he referred to as joint trusteeship by China and the United States was proposed with a view to postwar international relations and the regional power balance. Chiang’s choice here is closely related to the war/ Cold War dispensation and affords us a view of the different status of Taiwan and the Ryukyus in the Cold War environment. The kingdom of Korea, Siam, Vietnam, the Ryukyus and Burma were tied up with the tribute system centered on China, and Chiang regarded these relationships as the basis of a moral obligation to them in their struggle for their independence and freedom; he did not see these as relationships of sovereignty.  He thus sought to combine the Chinese historical worldview with the values of the Chinese national revolution in an attempt to adapt to the new world order. From this perspective, Chiang’s position stands in clear contrast to the British attitude of trying to maintain its colonial system in Asia.

The United Sates Diplomatic Papers also have a record of the meeting between Roosevelt and Chiang on November 23, although the record was translated into English from notes in Chinese. An “Editorial Note” in the Papers says: “No American official record of this meeting has been discovered, so it is clear that neither party made any preparations. In 1956, in response to a query from our editors, the Chinese ambassador in Washington, Dr. Hollington Tong confirmed that there is a Chinese language summary of this meeting in the ROC archives.” The material on this and its English translation in the American archives was provided by the authorities on Taiwan. The Editorial Note also points out that the Chinese record differs at certain points from Elliott Roosevelt’s memories and did not touch upon some issues mentioned by the latter (N24), such as the future status of the Malay states, Burma, and India concerned British colonies and was not referred in the three-power “joint declaration.”

It is noteworthy that Chiang’s diary entry for November 15 mentioned that China should propose Siamese independence, but the three-power “joint declaration” only refers to the independence of Korea, something surely related to British attitudes. During the whole course of the Cairo Conference, China and the United States engaged in profound conversation, their attitudes being quite “sincere” (*chengzhi*, Chiang’s word). For their part, however, the British quarreled frequently with China, as they did not wish to give up their colonies in Asia. British and American attitudes differed significantly on the issue of colonialism in Asia: the United States hoped that the European metropolitan states of Britain, France, and Holland could follow the American example in the Philippines and allow their colonies to gain independence. The American position was thus in many ways similar to China’s, but Britain was trying its best to maintain its imperial rule, even to the point of refusing to recognize China’s great power status (N25). In fact, it was not even as easy matter to secure a place for Korean independence in the Cairo Declaration. The contingency plan for the Conference prepared for Chiang by the secretariat of the Supreme Commission for National Defense made a point of singling out Korean independence as a special item and added a detailed “explanation”: as for Korean independence, “the Soviet Union might not wish to offer an opinion because of its current relationship with Japan; Britain may not support it out of concern for its influence on the Indian question, and if the U.S. and Britain cannot reach agreement, the U.S. is bound to be hesitant. Under these circumstances, if China offers unilateral recognition, the world may get the impression that the alliance has developed fractures…(N26)” During the course of the conference China and Britain held differing opinions and often contended with one another on the wording of articles concerning the return to China of Manchuria, Taiwan, and the Pescadores, as well as on Korean independence (N27). On the pretexts that the British cabinet had yet to discuss the issue and that the Soviet attitude toward the matter needed to be considered, the British Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Cadogan, even suggested deleting the section on Korean independence. At the insistence of China and the United States, however, this provision ultimately passed and was included in the joint declaration (N28). After the conference concluded, Chiang wrote in the section of his diary devoted to “ reflections on last week” — he added reflections to his diary every week, month and year — that “ the three-power joint declaration included statements by Britain and the U.S. of the restoration to China of the territories of the three Manchurian provinces, Taiwan and the Pescadores, which have been lots to us for between 12 and fifty or more years, as well as recognition of the post-war freedom and independence of Korea, and thus represents unprecedented diplomatic success — these are great events, great proposals and great hopes. If we do not keep up the struggle hereafter, however, this will all be merely worthless paper” (N29). Chiang’s excitement fairly permeates his text.

Chiang Kai-shek’s attitude toward the Ryukyus should be analyzed in light of all the questions raised at the Conference. I will at this point set out the meeting between Chiang and Roosevelt as recorded in English in the United States Diplomatic Papers and in Chinese in *A Compilation of Historical Materials on ROC Diplomacy*, while cross-referencing these against Chiang’s diary entries. The records of the meeting are as follow: “Generalissimo Chiang and president Roosevelt agreed that the four Northeastern provinces, Taiwan and the Penghu islands [*Pescadores*] which Japan had taken from China by force must be restored to China after the war, its being understood that the Liaotung Peninsula and its two ports, Lüshun (Port of Arthur and Dalian) [are] also included. The President then referred to the question of the Ryukyu Islands and enquired more than once whether China would want the Ryukyus. The Generalissimo replied that China would be agreeable to joint occupation of the Ryukyus by China and the United States and, eventually, joint administration by the two countries under the trusteeship of an international organization.” (N30) According to the English summary of the memorandum, Roosevelt did not speak of handling the Ryukyus over to China, but the English wording —“ The President then referred to the question of the Ryukyu Islands and enquired more than once whether China would want the Ryukyus” — suggests rather a kind of test, and furthermore “ enquired more than once whether…” Did Roosevelt’s notion of maintaining “adequate military forces on various bases in the Pacific” and of a military presence in the Pacific hint at an American interest in the Ryukyus? If not, why, when asked by Roosevelt whether he “would want” the Ryukyus, would Chiang not only refuse “exclusive” possession, but even say that his proposal for joint trusteeship was to “reassure the U.S.,” and then go on to declare that “the task [i.e., the military occupation of Japan] should be carried out under the leadership of the United States and that China could participate in the task”?

The three-power Joint Declaration published at the Cairo conference does not mention the Ryukyu question, nor does it appear in either the draft or the revised version of the American Communiqué in the United Sates Diplomatic Papers, nor in the British draft Communiqué. All three versions express the determination found in both American versions that the islands in the Pacific which have been occupied by the Japanese (many of them are powerful military bases), will be taken from Japan forever, and the territory such as Taiwan and Manchuria will be returned to China. The third and fourth paragraphs of the revised American version adds: “We are determined that the islands in the Pacific which have been occupied by the Japanese — many of them made powerful bases — contrary to Japan’s specific and definite pledge not to militarize them, will be taken from Japan forever.” “The territory that the Japanese have so treacherously stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria and Formosa, will of course be returned to the Republic of China. All of the conquered territory taken by violence and greed by the Japanese will be freed from their clutches. (N31)” The printed version of the British Communiqué has the words “and the Pescadores” written in fountain pen after the word “Formosa.” All three versions mention the liberation and independence of Korea, but neither the Ryukyus, taken in Chiang’s diary to be of similar historical status to Korea, nor Siam appears. The final version of the Cairo Declaration reads: “It is the purpose of the three great Allies that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1941, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea should become free and independent. (N32)”

While their historical origins and World War II plights all differed from one another, the postwar fortunes of Outer Mongolia, Thailand, Vietnam, Korea and the Ryukyus must be understood in the context of the entire history of colonialism as well as the wartime situation, the waxing and waning of the great powers, and, especially, of the American strategy and hegemonic intentions in the postwar Asia-Pacific. In other words, the Okinawa problem grew out of the complicated relations with colonialist history, the Pacific conflict, and the Cold War, as well as being the product of the formation of the modern world order. Based upon the analysis mentioned above, the Ryukyus' role in the Cold War had been determined by 1943, when the war had yet to end, but postwar arrangements had already been placed on the Great Power agenda. At present, with the Soviet Union having ceased to exist, the justification for American military bases in Asia has also been correspondingly and dramatically transformed — the Cold War structure has been reengineered. The question raised by the Okinawan social movement not only concern its fate and the maintenance of peace in the Asia-Pacific area, but are also related to the rethinking of the modern world order and its future evolution.

The discussions between China on the one hand and Britain and the United States on the other over such issues as the Ryukyus, Thailand, and Korea revealed both the differences and the relationship between the traditional notion of internal-external and the nation-state notion of internal-external shaped by the concept "sovereignty." In political actuality, these two worldviews may overlap, but they cannot define one another. In the Chinese nationalist narrative, the aggression of the Western powers, the rise of Japan, the decline of China, the corruption of the Chinese sociopolitical system, and its technological and military backwardness constitute the basic measures of China's crisis. Since it objectively presents the contestation between different levels of strength — and its consequences — in the era of nationalism, this discourse still has significant explanatory power. It has been unable to fully disclose, however, the great worldwide changes to relationships and norms. Aside from conceiving the path of the rise of the nation-state in an exclusively nationalist framework, the real problem of the national narrative is that it cannot produce new images and norms for international relations --- the core of Eurocentrism lies in its having established rules according to the demands of Western interests and then having universalized them. Any critique of Eurocentrism must thus involve the reformulation of those rules themselves. As a result, when discussing matters having to do with the Cold War and nationalism, it must first be asked what point of view we are working under — is it within a nationalist or a pre- or postnationalist perspective? Without first asking ourselves this, we will not be able to break out of the "universal rules" that have held sway since the nineteenth century.

**Okinawa's political choices and their significances to the peace of Northeast Asia**

During the Japanese postwar recovery period, the United States could regard Okinawa as its own base, rather than as a base in Japan; Even when Okinawa was returned to Japanese jurisdiction, a psychological distinction between the Japanese homeland and Okinawa would continue to exist. The Americans entered this area with their Western standpoint, but they were well aware of the existence of the internal differences within the region - they took advantage of the history of Japanese modern colonialism to insert themselves into the differences created by that colonialism. If this problem is probed more deeply, the dramatic changes of the fundamental international rules happening in the last century would become evident. The pre-nineteenth-century model no longer exists, the Okinawa Kingdom has vanished, the tribute system has collapsed, but its geohistoricalposition and its special mechanism of occupation constitute particular historical problems in the Asian region. Therefore, the Okinawa question provides us with a unique perspective to reflect upon the history of modern nationalism and imperialism. What are its implications for the Cold War framework, and why, in the post-Cold War era, has the Cold War in Asia not come to an end? Questioning this from the perspective of Okinawa also provides a unique perspective from which to understand the Cold War and the post-Cold War order.

Exactly for these reasons, Okinawa's social and political movement has a relatively special meaning. For example, should Okinawa pursue the status of being an independent country? Even if independence is being considered, what type of independence does it imply if it is placed in the game of the two rules since the 19th century? In short, on what historical basis should the autonomy of Okinawa be?  Okinawa's social movement raises questions from the viewpoint of politics, which is not to discuss in isolation Okinawa's history and autonomy, but to develop its dimensions from the perspective of the reflections upon the war and of the responsibility for the future. Okinawa's social movement also led to its own constitution draft and some related ideas, and new differences of opinions have also been generated from these ideas, and the reason for this is that the problem of Okinawa's historical status is woven in a very complex historical process.  Probing Okinawa's ambiguous historical position and its vague independence or uniqueness is not simply to seek "national independence", but to pursue a new political form of autonomy - through the opposition to military occupation - the withdrawal of the US military base in Okinawa, and they also put forward the issue of the complex roles that the Japanese Constitution and the Security Treaty played in the evolution of history.  Each political struggle has its specific directions, goals and slogans and it is not possible to understand it in a unidirectional way. As for the eventual status of Okinawa, there has been much discussion and disagreement within the Okinawan social movement. I think the source of the fuzziness of this discussion derives from the international relationships we now find ourselves in, where no space is provided to imagine any different sorts of relationships. No matter how we talk about the decline of the nation-state, the model that the nation-state functions as the main contemporary political entity has not changed. Relationships of sovereignty do not exist in isolation and cannot be unilaterally put into effect by a single national entity; it is in this sense that the fuzziness of the Okinawa issue is inevitable.

However, from another point of view, the so-called fuzziness isn't exactly the result of the fact that we are accustomed to observing history from the perspective of nation - national sovereignty? In the tribute relations in the 19th century, the flexibility in interpreting the rules from the perspective of democracy is ambiguous. The existence of Okinawa Kingdom and its multiple relationships with Japan and with Qing China used to be a factor to avoid the war of hegemony in this region; in the process of restoring the Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations as well as dealing with the diplomatic dispute over the Diaoyu Island and the South China Sea, Deng Xiaoping once defined a different strategy of fuzziness, namely "never giving up sovereignty,shelving differences and seeking joint development." " Never giving up sovereignty" indicates the recognition of the principle of sovereignty in contemporary international relations, but "shelving differences" means setting aside the dispute over the principle of sovereignty, which is in fact dealt with fuzziness. “Seeking joint development" creates the opportunity for China to develop in peace.  From the 1970s up to now, this relatively fuzzystrategy has created conditions for Northeast Asia to be relatively in peace. Here a saying of a Chinese artist is quoted: "An open issue, implies infinite possibilities." The "open issue" of Ryukyu Kingdom has lasted for two or three hundred years, while Deng Xiaoping's "open issue" lasts only for thirty years. Today, this strategy of fuzziness seems to be difficult to sustain, as all states inside and outside of the region are attempting to make more clearly sovereignty the cornerstone of their foreign relations. My opinion is: the strategy of fuzziness is losing its validity, but what is needed at present is not to return to the logic of sovereignty dispute, in other words, not to go back to the relationships of sovereignty which have been gradually generated since the 1870s and defined by the international law of imperialism; We should gain the inspiration in theory and in practice from the multiple perspectives of history, reality and future and from this "open issue" which once guaranteed or created the relative peace, and eventually define and implement a political theory different from the logic of sovereignty of the 19th century. The revelation of the Okinawan social movement to us is: the total demilitarization of this region is the guarantee of peace.

**Notes:**

1. Brian Hioe / Houston Small, “*Riben makesi zhuyi”, xin zuoyi yundong he lishi de bianzhengfa — binggu xingren fangtan lu*” (“Japnese Maxism,” New Left movements and the dialectics of history — the Interview of Kojin Karatani), Foreign Theoretical Trends, 2016, No.4, p.7.

2. Brian Hioe / Houston Small, “*riben makesi zhuyi”*, p.8.

3. Kemuyama Sentaro, *Seikanron FissŌ* (The truth about the discourse on invading Korea) (Tokyo: Waseda Daigaku Shuppanbu, 1909), p. 231.

4. Okubo Toshiaki, *Iwakura shisetsu no kenkyū* (A study of the Iwakura diplomatic delegation) (Tokyo: Munetaka Shob*Ō*, 1976), pp.161-162.

5. Kume Kunitake, *Bei* ***Ō*** *kairan jikki* (Record of a tour of Europe and America) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1981), vol.3, p.329.

6. Shinobu Seizaburo, *Nihon gaikŌ shi* (Diplomatic history of Japan) (Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1980), vol. I, p. 143.

7. On the visit of the Iwakura diplomatic delegation, see Xie Xiaodong, “*Yancang shituan yu Riben xiandaihua*” (The Iwakura Diplomatic Delegation and Japanese Modernization), (Jinzhou: Journal of Bohai University, 2006/03), (Philosophy and Social Science Edition), Vol.26, No. 2, pp. 68-71.

8. Wang Yunsheng, ed., *Liushi nian lai Zhongguo yu Riben* (China and Japan over the last sixty years) (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2005), vol. I, p. 38.

9. There is a close connection between the occupation of the Ryukyus and the invasion of Taiwan. In fact, even just after the Opium War, Shimazu Nariakira, the feudal lord of Satsuma, suggested that: “Since Britain and France got the upper hand over the Qing, the activity will move east…Therefore our priority should be to defend ourselves against the barbarians; we may either support the remnants of the Ming dynasty in taking Taiwan and Fuzhou, so as to get rid of the foreign threat to Japan. Our Satsuma forces would be sufficient for this task, but we have no warships and cannot fight for supremacy at sea. The urgent task at hand, therefore, is to prepare our armaments.” Wang Yunsheng, *Liushi nian lai*, pp. 63-64.

10. See my *Xiandai Zhongguo sixiangde xingqi* (The rise of modern Chinese thought), Introduction to Vol. I, Part I; Volume I, Part 2, “Diguo yu guojia” (Empire and state) (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2004).

11. Wang Yunsheng, *Liushi nian lai*, pp.64-65.

12. *Tongzhi chao chouban yiwu shimo* (The records of the diplomatic Affairs of the Tongzhi reign), vol. 93, pp. 29-30, quoted in Wang Yunsheng, *Liushi nian lai*, p. 72.

13. “Taiwan ‘Ban’chi seibatsu yŌryaku” (A summary of the expedition to the “barbarian” lands in Taiwan), in *Tai Shi kaiko roku* (Recollections of China), “A Guide to the Expedition to the Barbarian Land in Taiwan,” in *Recollections about China*, pp. 53-54, quoted in Wang Yunsheng, *Liushi nian lai*, pp.65-66.

14. *Li Wenzhong Gong quanshu-yishu hangao* (The complete works of Li Hongzhang — translated correspondence), vol. 2, pp. 36-39, cited in Wang Yunsheng, *Liushi nian lai*, p. 78-79.

15. Qing Ruji, *Jiawu zhanzheng yiqian Meiguo qinlue Taiwande ziliao jiyao* (Compilation of materials concerning the American aggression in Taiwan prior to the 1894 War), cited in Wang Yunsheng, *Liushi nian lai*, p. 105.

16. Payson J. Treat, *Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Japan*, vol. I (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1932), p. 477. Quoted in Wang Yunsheng, *Liushi nian lai*, p.106.

17. A November 23 item in the Hopkins Papers of the “Cairo Conference” volume of the U.S. Diplomatic Papers mentions that Chiang paid considerable attention to the Soviet attitude toward China; he made a point of mentioning the Communist Party, Xinjiang issue, and the independence of Outer Mongolia. *United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States diplomatic papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943* (1943), (DC: Government Printing Office, 1961) p.376.

18. See, for example, an article entitled “*Jiang jieshi liangci jujue jieshou Liuqiu*” (Chiang Kai-shek twice refused to accept Okinawa), in *Jiefangjun bao*, December 24, 2007. *Huanqiu shibao* also published an article, “*Diaoyu tai huogen: erzhan hou Jiang Jieshi liang ju Liuqiu huigui*” (The roots of the Diaoyu tai discord: Chiang Kai-shek twice refused the restoration of the Ryukyus after World War II), which has circulated widely on the Internet.

19. *Zhonghua Minguo waijiao shiliao dang’an huibian* (12), p. 6015.

20. *Chiang Kai-shek, An Inventory of His Diaries in the Hoover Institution Archives*, 43-10 (November, 1943), November 15.

21. *Chiang Kai-shek, An Inventory of His Diaries*, 43-10 (November, 1943), November 17, emphasis added.

22. The fourth item under “Articles about truce and peace negotiations” in *Guofang zuigao weiyuanhui mishu ting cheng Jiang Weiyuanzhang guanyu zhunbei zai Kailuo huiyi zhong tichuzhi zhanshi junshi hezuo, zhanshi zhengzhi hezuo ji zhanhou Zhong-Mei jingji hezuo deng san’ge fang’an* (Three formulas for proposing at the Cairo Conference military and political cooperation during the war and economic cooperation between China and the U.S. in the postwar period, presented by the Secretariat of the Supreme Council on National Defense to Generalissimo Chiang) (November 1943; the date of the original copy is uncertain) explicitly mentions “restoring all the territory taken and occupied since 1894.” *Zhonghua Minguo waijiao shiliao huibian* (12), p. 6022.

23. According to findings of historical researchers, after 1624, the Chinese in the Ryukyus never gained decision-making power, and their function was limited to supervising the tribute-paying of the Ryukyuan king. For Japan to use this precedent to claim the right to rule the Ryukyus, therefore, has no basis.

24. *United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States diplomatic papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943* (1943), (DC: Government Printing Office, 1961) pp.322-323.

25. Luobote-Dalaike (Robert Dallek), *Luosifu yu Meiguo duiwai zhengce* (Franklin D. Roosevelt and American foreign policy, 1932-1945), trans. Chen Qidi et al. (Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1984), pp. 612, 474, 556. On the difference between the United States and Britain on their relationship to China and Asian colonies, see Wang Jianlang, *Cong Jiang Jieshi riji kan kangzhan houqide Zhong-Ying-Mei guanxi* (Sino-British-U.S. relations in the late anti-Japanese war period in the diary of Chiang Kai-shek, *Minguo dang’an* (Republican Archives) 4 (2008).

26. *Zhonghua Minguo waijiao shiliao dang’an huibian* (12), pp. 6021-6022.

27. For example, Britain opposed wordings like “the four Northeastern four provinces and Taiwan must be restored to China” and “the necessity of granting independence to Korea,” advocating it be replaced by “must certainly be given up by Japan” and “leave Japanese rule,” out of fear of the associations this might conjure up in its Asian colonies. *Zhonghua Minguo waijiao shiliao huibian* (12), p. 6064.

28. *Zhonghua Minguo waijiao shiliao dang’an huibian* (12), p. 6035.

29. *Chiang Kai-shek, An Inventory of His Diaries in the Hoover Institution Archives*, 43-10 (November, 1943), November 22-26, 1943. This entry records this reflections following the Cairo Conference. Prepared by Lisa H. Nguyen, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 2006, updated 2007, 2008.

30. The version translated in English: “The president then referred to the question of Ryukyu islands and enquired more than once whether China want the Ryukyus. The Generalissimo replied that China would be agreeable to joint occupation of the Ryukyus by China and America and, eventually, joint administration by the two countries under the trusteeship of an international organization.” *United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States diplomatic papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943* (1943), (DC: Government Printing Office, 1961) p.324.

31. The original English version: “We are determined that the islands in the Pacific which have been occupied by the Japanese, many of them made powerful bases contrary to Japan’s specific and definite pledge not to militarize them, will be taken from Japan forever. The territory that Japan has so treacherously stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria and Formosa, will of course be returned to the Republic of China. All of the conquered territory taken by violence and greed by the Japanese will be freed from their clutches.” *United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States diplomatic papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943* (1943), (DC: Government Printing Office, 1961) p.403. A copy of the printed British document mentioned below can be found on p. 404.

32. *Zhonghua Minguo waijiao shiliao dang’an huibian* (12), pp. 6004-6005.