
"On the American side, Europe must always keep its eyes open and provide no pretext for reprisals. America grows stronger every day. It will become a colossal power and a moment must come when, placed vis-à-vis Europe in easier communication through new discoveries, it will wish to have its say in our affairs and to lay its hand upon them. Political prudence therefore imposes upon the governments of the old continent the duty of scrupulously ensuring that no pretext offers itself for such an intervention. The day America sets foot in Europe, peace and security will be banished from it for a long time." — Talleyrand, Mémoires, lettres inédites et papiers secrets, Paris, Savine, 1891.

NATO: METAMORPHOSES OF A POLYMORPHOUS COMPLEX

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The history of NATO is the history of the metamorphoses through which the United States adapts, according to the circumstances, the guiding thread of its grip on the Eurasian continent. The political, ideological, economic, operational, and informational dimensions of the NATO complex reinforce one another, intertwine, and vary in the share they take within the whole. NATO's actions provoke reactions from the adversaries the organisation designates. The future is not set in stone.

Keywords: United States of America; Eurasia; metamorphoses; complex; adaptation; domination.

Whether it is praised or decried, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is frequently oversimplified. The date of its progressive constitution (1950–1952) is regularly confused with that of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty (1949)¹, from which it emerged. The confusion between the organisation and the treaty privileges the military aspect at the expense of diplomatic intent.

NATO is a complex in the primary Latin sense of *complexus*, "woven together," but also of an embrace, even a hostile embrace, *complexus armorum*, "complex of arms," hand-to-hand combat. The weaving of NATO is a permanent process of adaptation to changes and to the corresponding wishes of its leaders, beginning with those of the United States of America, who set the tempo. The term "complex" also refers to the "military-industrial complex" coined by President Dwight Eisenhower in his farewell address of 17 January 1961. The complexity is reinforced by the discreet, even secret, character of certain embedded or peripheral arrangements. The notion of a "polymorphous complex," used in chemistry and

biology, refers to entities presenting themselves under different forms while preserving their basic identity. That said, complexity does not exclude the unexpected that is inherent in every historical phenomenon.²

The NATO complex, centred on the United States of America and associated with external partners, is shrouded in a nebula.

THE ORIGINS OF NATO AND THE "COLD WAR"

On its website, NATO presents itself thus: "It is often said that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was created to counter the threat posed by the Soviet Union. This is true, but it is slightly misleading. In reality, the Alliance was founded for three purposes: to deter Soviet expansionism, to forbid the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a strong North American presence on the continent, and to encourage European political integration."³ Few official statements by NATO are quite so candid, albeit with certain ulterior motives.

In his interview with the Russian daily *Kommersant*, George Friedman explains: "Above all, the alliance potentially most dangerous to the United States has always been an alliance between Russia and Germany. That would be an alliance between German technology and capital and Russian natural and human resources."⁴ History largely corroborates the assertion on NATO's website.

The organisation's origins can be traced back to the First World War, the Paris Peace Conference and the establishment of the Council on Foreign Relations in 1921.

"The strong presence of North America" polices the European nations with their "nationalist militarist" ambitions, kept in check by "European integration."

The North Atlantic Treaty was signed on 4 October 1949 in Washington; in October 1950, a military command of the Allied forces in Europe was established; in December 1950, the North Atlantic Council appointed General Dwight Eisenhower Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR); on 20 September 1951, in Ottawa, the convention on the status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was signed; the post of Secretary General was created in February 1952 for the benefit of Lord Ismay. Successive buildings housed the organisation. The headquarters was installed at Rocquencourt, near Paris, on 2 April 1951, while Field Marshal Montgomery was appointed Deputy SACEUR. In 1952, the seat moved from London to Paris, first at the Hôtel Astoria, then at the Palais de Chaillot.

The intention, however, goes well beyond the indications on NATO's website, since the peaceful Élysée Treaty of 22 January 1963 between Adenauer's Germany and de Gaulle's France was burdened at the Bundestag with a preamble anchoring the Federal Republic to the United States and to NATO, even inviting the inclusion of the United Kingdom in the European Economic Community. In short, anything but a European Europe. A former German social-democratic leader, Klaus von Dohnanyi, who served as a minister under Willy Brandt, recently revisited this consequential event: "Germany and Europe are not today sovereign in

matters of security policy and foreign policy. It is the United States that sets the tone here in Europe. [...] Dilution of the (Franco-German) treaty of 1962–1963 through the introduction of a preamble (inspired by the United States). [...] The debate divided the parties in the Federal Republic into 'Gaullists' and 'Atlanticists.' [...] A chance for a strong and sovereign Europe was blocked with the help of the United States and Great Britain. They thus blew up the Franco-German cooperation that had been sought, much to de Gaulle's dismay."⁵

THE POST-USSR NATO COMPLEX: ALL-DIRECTIONAL AND OFFENSIVE

The fool's bargain of German reunification

The breach in the Berlin Wall briefly opened up a field of possibilities. The transformation of the GDR was one option; East German reformers were sketching out forms of association with the Federal Republic. German unification could have presided over that of a greater Europe. The Russians believed it; they were made the dupes of the transatlantic farce by consenting to German unity, only for unified Germany to turn against them. The USA preferred the domination and humiliation of Russia to a peace of equilibrium in Eurasia,⁶ and the European leaders consented to their own vassalisation.

Brazenly, NATO and its spokespersons contest the repeated commitments made by Western leaders to the Russian authorities: "The myth that Western leaders promised not to let any other country join NATO has been circulating for many years, and this so-called promise is frequently mentioned in the disinformation campaigns that the Kremlin has been conducting since the beginning of the war against Ukraine." And yet: "Not once, but three times, Baker tried out the 'not one inch eastward' formula with Gorbachev in the February 9, 1990, meeting."⁸ Backed by meeting records, the National Security Archive has produced two series of declassified documents concerning NATO expansion that contradict NATO and corroborate Russian assertions.⁹

Ten years of illusions

On 21 November 1990, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe carried the hopes of a lasting peace between the former adversaries of the Cold War. The Moscow Treaty, signed two months earlier on 12 September, had opened the door to German unification without offering the USSR any formal guarantee of non-extension of NATO eastward. On 13 and 14 June 1991, in Prague, the fate of the European Confederation launched by President François Mitterrand was sealed. The most Atlanticist states (Czech Republic, Poland...) demanded nothing less than the inclusion of the United States, Canada, and Japan.¹⁰ On 1 July 1991, the Warsaw Pact was dissolved.

In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty surreptitiously incorporated NATO into its architecture. The Lisbon Treaty reinforced the security provisions and partnership with NATO, which hindered the pursuit of peace.

The Rome Summit of 1991 put forward a "new strategic concept" founded on security and on the breadth of threats, particularly concerning supplies of vital resources.

NATO's first combat engagement took place on 28 February 1994, four years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, when two F-16s of the US Air Force shot down four Serbian aircraft flying over Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The extent to which Europe is tied to the interests of the United States of America varies depending on historical circumstances, the balance of power and the ideological perspective of successive leaders.

The common distinction between American isolationists and interventionists is simplistic. Walter Russell Mead distinguishes the federalism of Alexander Hamilton, centred on the protection of commerce; the negotiating approach of Thomas Jefferson; the militarism of Andrew Jackson; and the "idealism" of Woodrow Wilson.¹¹ This framework deserves nuance and updating. Pierre Hassner described the practice of George W. Bush as "wilsonisme botté" — Wilsonianism in boots. Jean-Yves Haine distinguishes three schools among the entourage of G. W. Bush: the neoconservatives (David Horowitz, Robert Kagan...), the nationalists (Richard Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld), and the "traditionalists" (Colin Powell).

In short, no American administration can be reduced to a single doctrine.

It is a field of forces, a precipitate of diverse guiding ideas and of reactions to foreseen events (including self-fulfilling prophecies) or unforeseen ones. The tree of the US President must not obscure the forest of his administration and its lobbies.

The decisive metamorphoses took place between 1997 and 1999.

At the NATO summit in Paris on 27 May 1997, Russia was an invited guest. The summit barely managed to salvage the appearance of a genuine agreement.

The Russians obtained the minimum of guarantees. The repeated warnings¹² of Michel Rocard, former Prime Minister turned European parliamentarian, were not taken seriously: "First problem: Russia. A great power that is isolated always risks provoking instability in others. We had the pleasant surprise of finding that the 'founding act,' signed on 27 May between NATO and Russia, was somewhat more precise than one might have imagined. I remain convinced, however, that, for lack of ratification by national Parliaments — and therefore if it were limited to a simple non-legally-binding intergovernmental agreement — and for lack of truly placing the NATO-Russia relationship at the heart of the global security architecture, this agreement will not suffice to fully reassure Russia, its elites, and its people."¹³

Already in February, on the other side of the Atlantic, the veteran diplomat George Kennan, in his alarm call entitled "NATO: A Fatal Error," had written: "expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era."¹⁴

1997 was also the year of publication of Zbigniew Brzezinski's masterwork *The Grand Chessboard*. It sets out in considerable detail the reasons for and the means (NATO and the EU) of advancing American influence over the Eurasian continent. Ukraine is described therein as one of five pivot countries.

From James Carter to Joseph Biden, Democratic administrations have drawn heavily on the ideas of Zbigniew Brzezinski.¹⁵

The year 1999 ends illusions, in theory and in practice

At the National Assembly, the rapporteur Paul Quilès presented a clear assessment of the situation in his introduction: "The disagreements persisting among allies should lead to the adoption of a compromise text shorn of rough edges, from which the most contentious elements will have been removed and which will be open to various interpretations. The American administration, which wishes to make the Washington Summit a grand commemoration, wants to demonstrate the vitality of an Alliance that has succeeded, precisely because of the strength of the transatlantic bond, in surviving the disappearance of the threat that gave it birth. But the difficulties that will be masked by the drafting skills of the new text will not thereby disappear, and the Washington Summit should be only one stage in the evolution of transatlantic relations. [...] Their wish [that of the United States] to define, within the Alliance, a strategy for combating the new risks they regard as threats meets with objections from countries such as France, which favour non-military modes of action and a strengthening of multilateral control regimes.

"Furthermore, the question arises of the modalities for Europe's accession to an autonomous military capacity, a question that is all the more acute given that the United States insists, forcefully, on its refusal to see formed within the Alliance a European 'caucus,' that is, a bloc of European states defending a common policy. [...] The United States proposes that the new concept describe NATO's crisis management missions broadly and extensively, while the European allies propose more cautious formulations.

"The United States considers that peacekeeping operations, just like those of collective defence, can be conducted without the authorisation of the United Nations Security Council."¹⁶

Paul Quilès's substantial report was tabled on 24 March 1999, the very day the first bombardments began against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The NATO Washington Summit took place on 24 and 25 April. NATO's website summarises it thus: "Celebration of NATO's 50th anniversary [the habitual confusion with the 1949 treaty]. Confirmation by the Allies of their determination to end President Milosevic's repression of the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo. Participation of Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic in their first summit meeting. [...] Strengthening of the Partnership for Peace and of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, as well as of the Mediterranean Dialogue."¹⁷

Conducted without the agreement of the Security Council, the bombardments of civilian targets (Belgrade's radio and television headquarters, a column of civilians, the Chinese embassy...) and military targets in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, from 23 March to 10 June 1999, under the pretext of a fabricated genocidal "Horseshoe Plan," manufactured by the Bulgarian and German intelligence services, were a demonstration of force and a signal to Russia, Serbia's historical ally. Associated with the military operations, France found itself bypassed when President Chirac vetoed certain strikes, with the United States reserving the right to conduct autonomous strikes.

The testimony of Commander P.-H. Bunel, tried for treason, provides ground-level information about the stakes surrounding the collection and exploitation of intelligence during the Kosovo war. "In that role, I was at the convergence point of all ground and aerial intelligence gathered by the military sensors operating in the field. I also took part in 'real' intelligence — that is, intelligence before it passed through the lying mincer of the general staffs, which sent it slowly upwards toward NATO's political instances. In the synthesis cell, I was able to follow the dilutions that the American 'analysts' at the Molesworth centre in England would attempt."¹⁸

FRANCE REJOINS NATO AND LOSES ITS BEARINGS

When measured against the subtleties of the Quilès report of 1999, the arguments presiding over France's return to NATO oscillate between untruth and confusion. Nicolas Sarkozy argued that France's association with NATO operations under the presidencies of François Mitterrand and Jacques Chirac amounted to a *de facto* integration. "And what I have discovered with the Prime Minister and with the government is that, although we are in NATO — because we are — very few people know it." To associate with the military committee was in no way to merge into NATO. Not content with conflating association and integration, Nicolas Sarkozy invoked the "Western family": "France wants peace, France wants freedom. And France knows, too, who its allies and its friends are: and I am not afraid to say that our allies and our friends are, first and foremost, the Western family."¹⁹ "To treat allies, friends and family as equivalent is reckless. Wisdom lies with de Gaulle, who said, "States have no friends, only interests." Unless one endorses the dubious cause of Occidentalism under American leadership. The former British Prime Minister Harold Wilson yielded to such a tendency: "But I took the opportunity of stressing Britain's determination to co-operate with the US in world peace and to refashion NATO on more modern principles. I made a great point of the role of race and colour in world affairs."²⁰ This latter remark might be consigned to a bygone past were it not reactivated in 2002 by the British diplomat Robert Cooper, former adviser to Prime Minister A. Blair and then to Javier Solana (High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union after having served as Secretary General of NATO). Cooper extolled "liberal imperialism" and the "double standard" in international relations.²¹ The practice of NATO over recent decades amply confirms the damage wrought by Western supremacism.²²

The left was not to be outdone. As president of the Socialist group in the National Assembly, François Hollande found Gaullist accents to criticise the Atlanticist proposal to reintegrate France into NATO.²³ Eight years later, as President of the Republic, François Hollande was to

complete the reintegration by having France quietly accede by night to the protocol on the status of the international military headquarters created pursuant to NATO.²⁴

In hindsight, Hubert Védrine's reply to Régis Debray²⁵ appears quite cavalier: "The positive consequences (increased influence) will only outweigh the risks (being swallowed up) if one develops within NATO — as within Europe, without setting the two arenas against each other — an ambitious and clear policy founded on independent strategic thinking. [...] But what use would the congratulations of President Vladimir Putin or those of Brazil — which cultivates its relations with the United States but would, through rhetorical attachment to the Third-Worldism of the 1970s, be glad to see France confined to its 1960s posture — be to the France of 2013?"²⁶ France did not develop "an ambitious and clear policy founded on independent strategic thinking." Moreover, the war in Ukraine is also the result of France's failure to honour its commitments (as guarantor of the agreement between President Yanukovich and the opposition in 2014, and of the Minsk II accords in 2015) and of its consequent alignment with the United States and, for the EU, with Manuel Barroso's anti-Russian policy.²⁷

In turn, the reinforcement of NATO led to the development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and of BRICS+.

Diplomats²⁸ and military officers²⁹ testify to the intellectual disarmament to which the NATOisation of minds leads. In March 2021, the "Open Letter from the Centre de réflexion interarmées to Mr. Jens Stoltenberg, Secretary General of NATO" did not receive the echo it deserved, nor did it dissuade the French authorities from endorsing the "NATO 2030" study.³⁰

THE FORMS OF THE NATO COMPLEX

From 14 member states in 1990, NATO has grown to 32 in 2025. The stages were the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991, succeeded by the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1994 and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in 1997. The NATO-Russia Council was established in 2002.

The NATO complex covers four fields of activity: 1) a function of modifiable political polarisation under the stewardship of the United States;³¹ 2) a strategic and operational function; 3) informational functions: the collection and processing of information (NCIA, NHCE in Oradea) and propaganda (NATO Strategic Communication Centre of Excellence in Riga); 4) economic functions: fundraising for the purchase of essentially American equipment (under cover of "interoperability" and "non-duplication") via the NSPA (NATO Support and Procurement Agency), the "multi-sovereign" innovation fund NIF, and the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA). These arrangements allow for the legal or illegal capture of allied technologies, and even the identification of key resource persons.

According to the organisation, the direct budget is "around 4.6 billion euros for 2025."³² The organisation prescribes the spending of member states: 2% of defence budget, 20% for equipment renewal.

The map of centres of excellence accredited by the Organisation³³ testifies to the spider's web³⁴ of the device.

PARTNERS AND NEBULA

Formal membership of NATO is not a necessary condition for participating in its activities. The American base at Wiesbaden hosts the NATO command support centre for Ukraine (NSTAU), where Ukrainian officers are trained and supervised for direct strikes against Russian forces.³⁵ Conversely, Ukrainian troops under Polish command had previously intervened in Iraq. At his 2015 lecture at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, George Friedman evoked the awarding of decorations to Ukrainian soldiers: "General Hodges, commander of US troops in Europe, awarded decorations to Ukrainian soldiers, in contravention of military regulations, but he did it, showing that this was his army."

Beyond its 32 member states, NATO maintains partnerships with 35 countries and several international institutions: the UN, the Partnership for Peace (which includes Switzerland), the Mediterranean Dialogue (which includes Israel), the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative...

During the Cold War, NATO harboured secret structures such as the Clandestine Planning Committee (CPC) or the Allied Clandestine Committee (ACC), charged with coordinating the Stay Behind military and paramilitary networks (code-named GLADIO). Once revealed, these structures were presented as responses to a possible occupation of Western Europe by Warsaw Pact troops.

In reality, they were involved in destabilisation and terrorist activities, particularly in Italy.³⁶ These structures were linked to the civil and military intelligence services³⁷ of the various countries (the SDECE in France).

Not everything changed after the end of the USSR. The CIA's secret prisons and flights,³⁸ Alliance Base,³⁹ the Crypto AG affair,⁴⁰ and the war in Ukraine illustrate the entanglements of the NATO galaxy. In the absence of actions labelled NATO, its networks, its nebula, are at work.

CONCLUSION

Though its headquarters, general staff, bases, and centres of excellence are in Europe, the spirit of NATO is in the United States.

Its survival after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, its extension to Russia's borders, its security generalisation, the absence of guarantees accorded to non-member states — all contravene the UN Charter.

Western leaders would have been well advised to take a closer look at the Russian proposals, which have been labelled an ultimatum.⁴¹

The negotiable Russian offer, which comprised a draft Russia–United States treaty and a proposed NATO–Russia agreement, was in line with the letter and spirit of Article 1, Section 1 of the UN Charter: "To take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace."

It falls to the UN and to the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe) to ensure international peace and security. The permanent members of the Security Council (the United States above all) abuse a "right of veto" that is in fact a blocking capacity. The UN Charter calls for compromise, as attested by Article 27, paragraph 3: "Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters [other than procedural questions] shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members."

Aligned with the United States and its warmongers, the Western countries and the European Union privilege NATO over an instrumentalised UN, the balance of forces over the pursuit of compromise, and the recourse to force over diplomacy.

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Footnotes

¹ Article 9: "The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall immediately establish a Defence Committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5."

² Edgar Morin, *De Guerre en guerre*, La Tour d'Aigues, L'Aube, 2023.

³ NATO, *A Short History of NATO*, <https://www.nato.int/fr/about-us/nato-history/a-short-history-of-nato>, consulted 16 November 2025.

⁴ Interview with G. Friedman on Russia Insider, <https://russia-insider.com/en/2015/01/20/2561>, consulted 12 May 2025.

⁵ Klaus von Dohnanyi, *Nationale Interessen*, München, Siedler, 2022, pp. 115–116. Translation by G. Galice.

⁶ The subtitle "American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives" of the American edition of Brzezinski's *The Grand Chessboard* is toned down in the French edition to "L'Amérique et le reste du monde" ("America and the Rest of the World"). The work *The Choice*, subtitled "Global Domination or Global Leadership," is similarly subtitled in French: "L'Amérique et le reste du monde."

⁷ NATO website <https://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/115204.html>, consulted 7 May 2025.

⁸ "Not once, but three times, Baker tried out the 'not one inch eastward' formula with Gorbachev in the February 9, 1990, meeting."

⁹ National Security Archive, <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early> and <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2018-03-16/nato-expansion-what-yeltsin-heard>, consulted 12 May 2025.

¹⁰ Roland Dumas, "Un projet mort-né: la confédération européenne," *Politique étrangère*, 2001, Portail Persée, https://www.persee.fr/doc/polit_0032-342x_2001_num_66_3_5109, consulted 7 May 2025.

¹¹ Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence* [*Sous le signe de la Providence*], Paris, Odile Jacob, 2003.

¹² Michel Rocard, "OTAN: danger," *Le Monde*, 17 April 1997.

¹³ Michel Rocard, *L'Express*, 3 July 1997, <https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/230991-michel-rocard-03071997-consequences-de-l-elargissement-de-l-otan>.

¹⁴ George F. Kennan, "A Fateful Error," *The New York Times*, 5 February 1997.

¹⁵ Gabriel Galice, "La crise ukrainienne à travers le prisme stratégique américain," *Le Temps*, 14 April 2014.

¹⁶ Information Report to the National Assembly No. 1495, tabled 24 March 1999, <https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/rap-info/i1495.asp>, consulted 7 May 2025.

¹⁷ NATO website, consulted 7 May 2025.

¹⁸ Pierre-Henri Bunel, *Crimes de guerre à l'OTAN*, https://www.google.ch/books/edition/Crimes_de_guerre_%C3%A0_l_OTAN/YD1PaeK8vaYC.

¹⁹ Nicolas Sarkozy, Élysée website, consulted 17 November 2025. <https://www.elysee.fr/nicolas-sarkozy/2009/03/11/declaration-de-mnicolas-sarkozy-president-de-la-republique-sur-le-retour-de-la-france-dans-le-commandement-integre-de-lotanet-la-defense-europeenne-a-paris-le-11-mars-2009> »

²⁰ "But I took the opportunity of stressing Britain's determination to co-operate with the US in world peace and to refashion NATO on more modern principles. I made a great point of

the role of race and colour in world affairs." Harold Wilson, *The Labour Government 1964–1970: A Personal Record*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971, pp. 49–50.

²¹ Robert Cooper, "The New Liberal Imperialism," *The Guardian*, 7 April 2002 <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/apr/07/1>>; and "Why We Still Need Empires," *The Observer* <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/apr/07/1>>.

²² According to the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, the post-9/11 wars cost \$5,900 billion and 4.5 million lives.

²³ François Hollande, *Libération*, 8 April 2008.

²⁴ National Assembly website, consulted 17 November 2025.

²⁵ Régis Debray, "La France doit quitter l'OTAN," *Le Monde diplomatique*, March 2013.

²⁶ Hubert Védrine, "L'OTAN, terrain d'influence de la France," *Le Monde diplomatique*, April 2013.

²⁷ Gabriel Galice, "L'obscur clarté de Manuel Barroso," *Le Temps*, 2 February 2015. <https://www.letemps.ch/opinions/lobscure-clarte-manuel-barroso?srsItd=AfmBOopKdnm8jl_a-bEmvcX9i4TeI1SB9UeyO68jA9RLtfE38yCVuGv>.

²⁸ Francis Gutmann, *Changer de politique*, Paris, Riveneuve, 2011. Gabriel Galice, « La lucidité de Francis Gutmann sur la France et le monde », *Le Temps*, 18 mars 2014, <<https://www.letemps.ch/opinions/luciditefrancis-gutmann-france-monde?srsItd=AfmBOornQSld6elxwada42twzbfIt04ZWTfNjZhjAMExXP2uLDPAoUdq>> and Gabriel Robin, *Entre empire et nation*, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2004.

²⁹ Including Commander Pierre-Henri Bunel, in his book *Crimes de guerre à l'OTAN*, Paris, Éditions 1, 2000.

³⁰ "Open Letter from the Centre de réflexion interarmées to Mr. Jens Stoltenberg," site *Asie 21*, 16 March 2021. <https://www.asie21.com/2021/03/16/lettre-ouverte-du-centre-de-reflexion-interarmees-a-monsieur-jensstoltenberg-secretaire-general-de-lotan/>

³¹ Giuseppe Gagliano, "L'OTAN et l'Europe dans la stratégie américaine," *Le Diplomate. Media*, consulted 17 November 2025.

³² "NATO Funding," NATO website, consulted 7 May 2025.

³³ Map of Centres of Excellence, NATO website, consulted 17 November 2025.

³⁴ Nils Andersson, "À quoi sert l'OTAN?," *La Pensée*, 385, 2016, pp. 71–83.

³⁵ France info, "Guerre en Ukraine: ce que l'on sait...," consulted 7 May 2025.

³⁶ Daniele Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies [Les Armées secrètes de l'OTAN]*, Plogastel-Saint-Germain, Demi-Lune, 2007. And the film by Francesco Rosi, *Illustrious Corpses (Cadavres exquis)*, 1976. The "strategy of tension" was intended to prevent the "historic compromise."

³⁷ See the illuminating Arte documentary "La guerre froide dans le grand Nord," evoking the assassination of Olof Palme.

³⁸ Dick Marty Report, "Secret Detentions and Illegal Transfers of Detainees Involving Council of Europe Member States," June 2007.

³⁹ A secret inter-agency base installed in Paris from 2002 to 2009. Others are said to have been created elsewhere.

⁴⁰ A Swiss company covertly purchased by the CIA. Dick Marty, "L'affaire Crypto montre la force de l'empire américain en Suisse," RTS, 14 February 2020.

⁴¹ Communiqué of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 December 2021.