

NATO IN PERSPECTIVE: OVERVIEW OF SOME NATIONAL VIEWS



Gabriel Galice*

"And it would be necessary to get rid of this dinosaur that is NATO. Let us cease to believe ourselves, Europeans, in opposition to Russia, and bring us closer to it."

John Le Carré, Zeit Forum Kultur, Hamburg, November 10 2008

Without going back to considerations formulated elsewhere, this text focuses on the evocation of non-French views of NATO. This exercise singularly permits us to take some height with respect to hexagonal trivialities. In 2009, officialising the return of France in the integrated command of NATO, President Nicolas Sarkozy was using the family metaphor: "France also knows who are its allies and who are its friends: our friends and our allies, it's foremost the western family. The conditions of independence are first of all to know where his family is." On the basis of a report by Hubert Védrine, President François Hollande completed the reinstatement of France in the Organization. The United States, Canada, Germany and Russia offer different contrasting visions, not only national but also ideological, conceptual and partisan. A nation is in fact irreducible to its State, a fortiori to its government. Any action leads to reaction or resistance.

*Foundation Board President of the Geneva International Peace Research Institute (GIPRI), author of *Les empires en territoires et réseau*, 2015 http://www.gcsp.ch/News-Knowledge/Publications/Les-empires-en-territoires-et-reseaux_and_Lettres_helvètes_2010-2014, Syrtis Editions, Geneva, 2016. This text was translated from French by Thomas Mercier, who previously provided a reasoned documentation for the French version.

NATO'S PAST EXPLAINS ITS PRESENT

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1949) presents itself as a defensive military alliance against the Soviet bloc, even before the formation of the Warsaw Pact (1955). It is based on Article 51 of the UN Charter, stipulating the "inherent right of individual or collective self-defence".

Self-defense hides the Anglo-Saxon hegemonic will, in which the United States of America progressively asserts their leadership. AMGOT (Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories) aimed at nothing less than replacing the German occupation with an American tutelage, the time to take its marks and make the junction with a Nazi administration recycled in the anti-Soviet and anti-communist struggle. The implementation of the "Stay Behind"¹ project with the recovery and exfiltration of Klaus Barbie take place in this context². The epicenter of this strategy of tension will be the Italy of the "historical compromise"³.

A multi-decades look at a few key NATO actors reveals both the polarization and diversity of national positions. Polarization stems from American prepotency in NATO and their leadership strategy aiming at tightening ranks. Diversity is intrinsic to the divergent interests of each country, but also to the interests of different states apparatus and the people who inhabit them.

As a "globalitarian" project, NATO invests all at once the military, political, economic and ideological spheres. The article 2 of the NATO charter states that the parties « will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them ». The NATO economic comity was created in 1957 and aims to ensure the interface between the economic and the military. Based on the experience of the Cold War and the subsequent years, this observation sheds light on or

¹ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yXavNe81XdQ> and Ganser, Daniele. *NATO's secret armies : Operation Gldadio and Terrorism in Western Europe*

² Businessman and adviser of the Bolivian dictatorship, Barbie, who became Altman, will maintain long links with the intelligence service of the Federal Republic of Germany, reconstituted around the Gehlen network.

³ The film by Francesco Rossi "Illustrious Corpses" (1976), taken from the "Cadavres exquis" novel by Leonardo Sciascia (1971), gives a good account of the political situation

assumes what the Organization is today, including its shadow areas. The archives reveals their secrets, actors speak. This reveals that NATO must be understood *stricto sensu* (a structured organization) and *lato sensu* (an organization in formal and informal networks, including paramilitary networks and places for information exchange). The extraordinary renditions organized by the CIA were based on NATO networks without necessarily soliciting the procedures of the Alliance. The same was true of the international anti-terrorist cell "Alliance Base", installed in Paris, declared dismantled after its reveal and Franco-American disagreement.

NATO AFTER THE COLD WAR AND THE AMERICAN VISION

The implosion of the USSR and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact led to a glimpse of a possible period of peace and disarmament. Unfortunately this brightening was short-lived; the Yugoslavian wars provided an opportunity to regenerate NATO.

The United States was faced with the choice between a tactical reinforcement of their hegemony or a strategic reshuffle by a comprehensive reform of the security system. Torn between different analyzes decision-makers favoured tactical security on strategic peace. The apparent visibility of the short term on the vagaries of the medium term and autonomy over the sharing of responsibilities influenced their choice. There was also a mixture of hubris and drunkenness due to the feeling of victory. This sentiment was a major factor in history; victorious countries underestimated the complexities of the future, including the power of emerging countries. The emphasis that the Americans decision-makers placed on the Russian threat concealed concern about the rise of China⁴.

What were the different strategic visions that were competing in the United States? Perry Anderson delivers a panorama of American thinkers and their controversies in his book *American Foreign Policy and its Thinkers*⁵. The vision of Charles A Kupchan is so confident that he proposes Russia's accession to the Alliance: « *the West is making a historic mistake in treating Russia as a strategic pariah (...) Anchoring Russia in an enlarged Euro-*

⁴ Laurent Murawiec book, *L'esprit des nations*, Odile Jacob, 2002, testifies this concern. It is a follow-up to *La Guerre au XXIè siècle*, Odile Jacob, 2000.

⁵ Perry Anderson, *American Foreign Policy and Its Thinkers*, London, Verso, 2015.

Atlantic order, therefore, should be an urgent priority for NATO today »⁶. Commenting Kupchan's book, *No One's World*, Anderson writes: "*Kupchan's idea was not to say goodbye to the « Liberal Internationalism » (..) A new balance had to be struck between the management of partnership and that of power* »⁷." Oscillating between conservatism and liberalism, this perspective presented the merit of opening the game. President Clinton preferred to seek strategic inspiration from the "hard-liners" like Brzezinski. Bertrand Badie recalls the leonine contract imposed to Russia: "*Bill Clinton reconnut publiquement le deal, voire le linkage: admettre la Russie dans le club des oligarques, puis à l'OMC à condition que Boris Eltsine approuve l'élargissement de l'OTAN à ses anciens satellites, voire à certaines des anciennes républiques soviétiques, à l'instar des Etats baltes.*"⁸

Zbigniew Brzezinski would draw the prospects of power relations and the conditions of US supremacy in his key work *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*. He explains in detail that the United States can assert its domination by controlling Eurasia and how the European Union and NATO must keep Russia and China in check. The author identifies five "geostrategic players": France, Germany, Russia, China and India and five "geopolitical pivots": Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Korea, Turkey and Iran. Brzezinski makes clear the dilemma of the integration or non-integration of Russia. The dilemma can be resumed as a choice between tactical balance and strategic design. "*Excluding Russia (from the EU or NATO) could have far-reaching consequences - it would validate Russia's darkest predictions - but the dilution of the European Union or of NATO would have highly destabilizing effects.*"⁹ The West has privileged tactical balance on the design. President William Clinton, advised by Brzezinski and the falcon Madeleine Albright, anxious to seduce the voters of East European origin, will take the party of NATO enlargement, therefore of the confrontation. *« One reason the Clinton administration*

⁶ Charles A. Kupchan, « NATO'S Final Frontier, Why Russia should join the Atlantic Alliance », *Foreign Affairs*, Saturday, May 1, 2010. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2010-05-01/natos-final-frontier>

⁷ *Comment les Etats-Unis ont fait le monde à leur image*, p.214-215.

⁸ Bertrand Badie, idem, p.37, referring to the Memories of William Clinton, *My Life*, New York, Vintage, 2005.

⁹ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, New York, Basic Books, 1997.

*supported the idea was its appeal to many American voters who had close ties with Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary*¹⁰. »

Did the United States betray their promise made in 1990 to the Soviet leaders not to extend NATO to the East? In the absence of a known written document, the controversy persists but is not essential. In politics, the acts speak as much as the writings (including those of Brzezinski). George Kennan, who was the theorist of “containment” during the Cold War, did not fail to denounce the extension of NATO to the East¹¹.

The Action Plan 1998-2000 of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council was diffused in January 1998. The Action Plan includes the transformation of conscription armies into professional armies and the restructuring (including privatization) of the defense armies¹².

An organization tends to endure, even if it is necessary to give itself new missions. In this case, NATO had to make new enemies: explicitly Russia and terrorism, implicitly China ... and all the others. Richard Holbrooke and Mark Brezinski, the son of Zbigniew Brezinski, intervened in the 2004 US election campaign to invite candidates to be "harder" when facing Russia. *“America must give Russia a dose of tough love.”*¹³

The discrete agreement of September 23 2008 between the Secretaries-General of the UN and NATO is rather vague to allow all confusions between peacekeeping and the right to war (jus ad bellum). It states: *“(...) Further co-operation will contribute significantly to the threats and challenges (...) of regular exchanges and dialogue, both at the decision-making and executive levels, on political and operational questions (...) Understanding that this framework must be flexible and evolving (...) Our cooperation will continue to develop in a practical way*¹⁴. » France, the United States and the United Kingdom have simultaneously pressured Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon to sign. Dimitri Rogozine, ambassador of Russia

¹⁰ Robert H. Donaldson, Joseph L Noguee and Vidya Nadkarni, *The Foreign Policy of Russia*, Routledge, 2014, p.249.

¹¹ <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/02/opinion/foreign-affairs-now-a-word-from-x.html>

¹² The suppression of conscription in France is concomitant (1997) with these concerted orientations

¹³ <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/73bfb41e-1802-11d9-9ac5-00000e2511c8.html#axzz3lBbqtLlF>

¹⁴ http://www.horizons-et-debats.ch/index.php?id=1299&print=1&no_cache=1

to NATO, denounces the illegality of an agreement that short-circuits the Security Council, Serge Lavrov says he is "shocked"¹⁵.

The examination of non-French views on NATO considers both the official voice of each state and the discordant expressions. After the United States, Canada, Germany (two member states) and Russia (an "Associated" State) will be reviewed. We shall see that the relative final coherence results from compromises, relations of forces as well as ambiguities.

THE CANADIAN CONFEDERATION

With 6% of the Organization's budget, Canada is a docile and singular little brother. Even if he is unlikely to thunderous rhetoric, he is involved in all the theaters of operation.

The country was of all military presences and interventions. In 1952, 10,000 Canadian soldiers were based in France and Germany. In 1966, during the closure of US and Canadian bases on French soil, Prime Minister Pearson allowed himself to question whether his country should also repatriate the bodies of the many Canadian soldiers who fell on French soil during the two world wars. In 1968-69, his successor Pierre Trudeau briefly considered withdrawing Canada from NATO.

Canada was the promoter of the economic dimension of defense and security. The defense of the North American continent is the most obvious, if not the most decisive. Politically, Canada had opposed the integration of Greece and Turkey into the Organization so as not to alleviate tensions with the USSR. Pierre Trudeau, the father of the current Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, had established a friendly relationship with Fidel Castro, without fear of standing out from the United States. "Co-operative security" and the political community are highlighted by Canadian leaders, who highlight "common values" to "export stability." Canada's withdrawal from NATO oversight operations for financial reasons in 2013 led to its exclusion from several high-tech markets. Due to the "Russian threat", the government is providing the Baltic and Ukrainian authorities with \$ 4 million to modernize their command and logistics equipment and to enhance their energy security. In June 2016, Canada commits to ordering a battalion of troops to be stationed in Poland and the Baltic States. « *In other*

¹⁵ Karl Müller, L'accord secret entre l'ONU et l'OTAN ne répond pas aux objectifs de la communauté internationale. », *Horizons et débats*, September 23 2008.

words, co-operative security, construed as a realistic alternative to collective security, is Pearsonian internationalism¹⁶ ». Well with the distinction that the original Parsonian internationalism of the Sixties was centered on development aid. The promotion of "values" functions for Canada as an ideological promotion of soft power. The extension of NATO's traditional missions to new challenges, cyber warfare and terrorism, as well as its support to the UN and the OSCE as much as possible, provide a justification (or a pretext?) to the enthusiastic involvement of Canada in the enlargement of the Organization. Canada sees in NATO expansion a revival of the article 2 of the NATO charter. « Thus, in addition to its traditional function of collective defence under Article 5, NATO could claim a new political vocation in taking on peacekeeping and crisis management tasks-so called non-Article 5 functions. These would be undertaken in response to political mandates from the UN and the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).the renamed CSCE¹⁷. »

Cristopher Anstis is less optimistic than the Canadian government on this renewal of Article 2. "The cold war NATO was key to American efforts to "contain" Soviet encroachment on democratic and free-market countries which threatened to compromise American access to markets. Does Washington see the post-cold war NATO as part of a strategy to bolster American efforts to enlarge free-markets in a globalized capitalist economy? NATO has now 1) intervened outside of the geographical area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty 2) in an unimaginable development, it has become the "hired gun" of the UN (and of the OSCE) and 3) the Americans now apparently believe that the Alliance could even embark on out-of-area military actions on its own authority. Finally, enlargement of NATO to the east extends the zone which Washington seeks to control in preventing the re-emergence of a major power in the form of a new zone of Russian influence in Eastern Europe If Washington continues to see NATO mainly in strategic terms as suggested by its resistance to Russian membership, Canada's hopes that NATO will become an instrument of cooperative security seem as misplaced as our previous ambitions to turn NATO into a North Atlantic community. There

¹⁶ David G. Haglund, « The NATO of its Dreams Canada and the Co-operative Security Alliance », in *Interntional Journal*, vol. 52, issue 3 (Summer, 1997), p.482.

¹⁷ Christopher Anstis, « Canada and NATO enlargement », *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, vol. 6, n°3, 1999

are grounds then to ask whether the “new” enlarged and more ambitious NATO will serve Canadian foreign policy aims better than the old one.”¹⁸

In “National Security” Stéphane Roussel and Samir Battiss argues that the Harper government would have, with the engagement in Afghanistan singularly, rallied a militarist and continental position, different from its predecessor and successor¹⁹. According to them Harper’s Canada completely broke with the historical personian internationalism of the previous Canadian governments. The critical site <http://www.mondialisation.ca> strongly denounces the NATO positions of the Canadian authorities "*For weeks now, Harper and the Conservatives have been making anti-Russian bellicose statements with the enthusiastic support of the opposition parties and the mainstream media Canadians*". Russian-Canadian rivalry over the exploitation of the Arctic reinforces animosity.

In a comparison between France and Canada, Justin Massie highlighted the "Canadianization" of the French position vis-à-vis NATO. Historically, the indirect rebalancing of France, the Gaullist tradition, was an exclusive one. For Canada it was an inclusive indirect rebalancing. By rejoining NATO France joined the Canadian "inclusive" posture to change the attitude of the United States of America from within. "*In other words, the post-Cold War convergence of the French and Canadian Atlantist policies is an inclusive indirect equilibrium, while both States seek to constrain American power through their military within NATO.*"²⁰

In short, Canada, its government and Canadian thinkers always wonders whether it is possible to at least influence a little on the US-led policies and how they can weigh as much as they can in the US dominated NATO.

¹⁸ Christopher Anstis (1999) Canada and NATO enlargement, In Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, Volume 6, numéro 3, page 110.

¹⁹ Stéphane Roussel – Samir Battiss (2010), « National Security », *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, vol. 16, n°2, p.27-43.

²⁰ Justin Massin (2011), « Le Canada, la France et la transformation de l’Alliance atlantique : des politiques de sécurité internationale convergentes », in *Etudes internationales*, vol. 42, N°1, p.25-46.

THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC

Germany's accession to NATO came in 1955, five years after its establishment in 1949. The first Secretary General of NATO (1952 to 1957), General Hastings Ismay summarized the objective of the Organization in Europe *"To keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down."*

The United States increased the pressure to reduce the scope of the treaty of Franco-German friendship known as the "Traité de l'Élysée", signed on January 22, 1963. Finally, the Bundestag introduced a preamble to the Treaty (voted on June 15, 1963), which tied Germany to transatlantic solidarity. If he did well in public, President Charles de Gaulle fulminated in private: *"Les Américains essaient de vider notre traité de son contenu. Ils veulent en faire une coquille vide. Tout ça, pourquoi ? Parce que les politiciens allemands ont peur de ne pas s'aplatir assez devant les Anglo-Saxons ! Ils se conduisent comme des cochons!"²¹*

The unification of Germany, the implosion of the USSR and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact reversed the maps within NATO. The United States now favours the alliance with Germany, a bridgehead towards Eurasia according to the well-argued strategy of Zbigniew Brezinski²². Margaret Thatcher was annoyed by this change : *" But with the new team's arrival in the White House, I found myself dealing with an Administration with saw Germany as its main European partner in leadership (...) I felt I could not always rely as before on American co-operation (...) the balance of power in Europe, where a reunified Germany would be dominant."*²³ Germany is home to two strategic locations (at least) of US forces: the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen (near the border with Austria), for strategic design and coordination with allies, and, for operational purposes, the Ramstein air base (near France), which, reconverted, plays a decisive role in guiding the drones striking Afghanistan or Yemen from the United States.

²¹ Alain Peyrefitte, *C'était de Gaulle*, Fayard, 1997, T II, p.228.

²² Zbigniew Brezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, New York, Basic Books, 1997.

²³ Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, London, Harper Collins Publishers, 1993, p.768 et 769.

Artisan of the Ostpolitik and faithful companion of Willy Brandt, Egon Bahr had promoted the idea of an independent Europe from the United States and denounced the extension of NATO in Eastern Europe ²⁴. He insisted that the accession of new states beyond Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic was a "gigantic mistake" ²⁵. German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier distinguishes himself from Chancellor Angela Merkel by adopting the views of Egon Bahr, Gerhard Schröder and Helmut Schmid that were critics of atlanticism²⁶. The cleavage between Atlantists and Eurasiatists does not separate bloc against bloc, conservatives and German Social-Democrats. Willy Wimmer, a 33-year-old CDU member of the Bundestag, former Secretary of State for Defense (December 1988-April 1992), is one of the most fervent supporters of a partnership with Russia. The Swiss independent weekly "*Horizons et débats*" translates and regularly publishes Wimmer's articles on NATO and Russia ²⁷; he has just published the book "*Le dossier Moscou*"²⁸.

THE FEDERATION OF RUSSIA

*"No event since the end of the Cold War was more symbolic of the new world order than the expansion of NATO. For Russia, it was a major blow to its national prestige. The Russians believed that in February 1990 U.S. Secretary of State James Baker had given assurances to Gorbachev that NATO would not move eastward"*²⁹. The American scholars' assertion is right in the first sentence cited; the follow-up is tendentious in that it encountered in question the assurances given to Gorbachev. Moreover, it was not a question of "prestige" but a problem of credibility, confidence and security.

²⁴ Egon Bahr, *Deutsche Interessen, Streitschrift zu Macht, Sicherheit und Aussenpolitik*, München, Blessing, 1998. One of the last public actions of Egon Bahr was his intervention alongside Michael Gorbachev for Germany to stop turning its back on Russia. <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/rusland-egon-bahr-und-michail-gorbatschow-fordern-neue-ostpolitik-a-1044774.html>

²⁵ http://www.zeit.de/1997/19/Es_waere_ein_riesiger_Fehler

²⁶ <http://www.courrierinternational.com/article/allemanne-le-ministre-des-affaires-etrangeres-tourne-le-dos-lotan>

²⁷ Current Concerns <http://www.zeit-fragen.ch/en/ausgaben/2016/nr-2-19-januar-2016/die-nato-bringt-uns-mit-diesem-kurs-um-und-das-mit-tatkraeftiger-mithilfe-der-eigenen-deutschen-regierung.html>

²⁸ Willy Wimmer, *Die Akte Moskau*, Zeitgeist 2016.

²⁹ Robert H. Donaldson, Joseph L Noguee and Vidya Nadkarni, *The Foreign Policy of Russia*, Routledge, 2014, p.254.

The authors of “*The Foreign Policy of Russia*” have the merit of proposing a rational grid of Russian foreign policy, breaking with the agreed discourses on Vladimir Putin’s psychology.

All Soviet and Russian leaders underlined the danger of a NATO extension to the East, to which they were not fully integrated. Yevgeny Primakov³⁰, Boris Yeltsin³¹, pulled the alarm bell in vain. Half-measure, the NATO-Russia Council was established on May 28 2002.

For Russia, the Partnership for Peace and the NATO-UN Council, proved to be poor consolation prizes. In the aftermath of 11 September 2001, Vladimir Putin expressed his full solidarity with the United States in the fight against terrorism. Moreover, the Russian authorities had not failed to inform their US counterparts in vain about the danger posed by the brothers Tsarnayev, the perpetrators of the Boston bombing.

The Russian response to NATO expansion includes rapprochement with China, notably through the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Whatever is the Western media’s saying, Russia is moderate in its statements, actions and reactions. The combination of NATO enlargement and the extension of its bases to the borders of the Russian Federation will not have been enough to trigger the Russian response. It took the drop of water of the Ukrainian coup to push Russia in deciding to counter-attack by supporting the secession of Crimea. Still in 2013, the concept of Russian foreign policy assumes that Russia shares with the Euro-Atlantic states the maintenance of peace and security. The tone changes with the new foreign policy approved by President Putin on 30 November 2016³². Point II.6 states:

³⁰ « Prior to the NATO decision, negotiations were begun in January between Russian foreign minister Evgenii Primakov and NATO Secretary general Javier Solana. Primakov took a strong line against Baltic membership in NATO. He publicly warned of the consequences if that were to happen. », *The Russian Foreign Policy*, p. 221

³¹ « Speaking in Budapest against the expansion of NATO, Yeltsin warned of a new « cold peace » in Europe. His allusion to the US was unmistakable when he observed. « History proves that it is a dangerous delusion to think that the fates of continent and of the world community as a whole can be controlled from a single capital. Just days earlier, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev had stunned the members of the NATO Council meeting in Brussels with an unexpected announcement that Russia would not join the Partnership for Peace Program pushed by Washington. ». *The Foreign Policy of Russia*, p.240.

³² http://www.mid.ru/fr/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptlCk86BZ29/content/id/2542248

“Force is becoming an increasingly important factor in international relations amid escalating political, social and economic contradictions and growing uncertainty in the global political system and economy. Efforts to expand and upgrade military capabilities and to create and deploy new types of weapons undermine strategic stability and pose a threat to global security which is underwritten by a system of arms control treaties and agreements. Although a large-scale war, including nuclear war, between major powers remains unlikely, they face increased risks of being drawn into regional conflicts and escalating crises.”

President Putin's speech at the 2016 edition of the Club de Valdaï highlights the "strategic deficit" of the West and the need to "transform this globalization for some in globalization for all" Vladimir Putin recalls that " Sovereignty is an essential part of the international relations system in the world today ".

In the adversity against NATO, the Ukrainian drama strengthens the Russian national unity, which brings together nationalists, patriots (essentially the party "United Russia" of which Putin is the figurehead), Communists, critical Marxists³³ and descendants of "White Russians"³⁴. Only a fraction of the oligarchy is playing his part in an anti-national globalization.

NOW WHICH SECURITY ARCHITECTURE?

The great powers have missed the window of possibilities that was the end of the Cold War. The "West" (understanding NATO and its peaceful and Asian extensions, SEATO having been significantly dismantled in 1977) had a hand, and by its contempt and arrogance towards all others, starting with the Russians and the Chinese. The allies of the United States of America did not render them service by submitting, more or less graciously, to their dictates (such as President Hollande refusing to hand over to Russia the Mistral sold by his

³³ <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/09/08/should-nato-be-helping-ukraine-face-russia/the-west-is-wrong-to-see-putin-as-the-enemy>

³⁴ <http://www.russkymost.net/spip.php?article70&lang=fr>

predecessor). The hubris prevailed on the phronesis. Former Councilor of Anthony Blair and Javier Solana, Robert Cooper went so far as to theorize "the new liberal imperialism".³⁵

All rules (legal, political, economic, military, security) governing international relations have to be reformed. The current order/disorder bears its coherence, despite its contradictions. In the meantime, to keep us looking for alternatives to NATO, two possibilities seem to be preferred.

Articles 46 and 47 of the UN Charter prescribe the establishment and role of a Military Staff Committee near to the UN Security Council. Who cares? Those who invoke the absence of an armed UN to justify NATO are careful not to push for the implementation of articles 46 and 47, which would presuppose the prevalence of dialogue with China and Russia.

The second alternative is the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Due to its composition and functioning, the OSCE is intended to be the backbone of the international security system. China must be integrated or associated with it.

³⁵ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/apr/07/1> In counterpoint read Claude Serfati, *la mondialisation armée* and David Harvey, *Le nouvel impérialisme*.